Ice Drop & Ice Cream Factory v. Vda. de Ramos
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute originated from a complaint filed by respondents Lucila Ponce Vda. de Ramos and others, seeking damages for the death of Atty. Francisco M. Ramos. The action was brought against two groups of defendants: Apollo Lacap and Fidel Lagman, and Ever Ice Drop and Ice Cream Factory, along with its partners Yusay Choo, Chua Bok Kian, Ong Hoc Gan, Tan Tia, and Roman Cabusay. The trial court rendered a judgment finding the defendants liable, ordering Apollo Lacap and Fidel Lagman to pay two-thirds of the damages, and Ever Ice Drop and Ice Cream Factory and its partners to pay one-third. 2. Procedural History: Following the trial court's decision on May 2, 1970, separate appeals were filed by the two groups of defendants. Atty. Fidel Zosimo Canilao, representing the first group, filed his notice of appeal and bond on June 2, 1970, and submitted the record on appeal on June 15, 1970. Atty. Job Mariano, representing the second group (petitioners herein), filed a notice of appeal and deposited the appeal bond on June 11, 1970, also requesting a 30-day extension to submit the record on appeal, which was granted. On June 30, 1970, the petitioners were allowed to adopt the record on appeal of the first group, provided their notice of appeal was incorporated. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal of the petitioners, Ever Ice Drop and Ice Cream Factory and its partners, citing that their joint record on appeal did not show on its face that the appeal was made on time, as required by Section 6 of Rule 41. 3. The Petition: The petitioners filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their appeal. Their primary contention was that while the printed joint record on appeal omitted the notice of appeal and the date of service of the decision, these documents were present in the original record on appeal filed with the trial court and subsequently forwarded to the appellate court. They invoked the principle that substantial compliance with procedural rules is sufficient, especially when the omission was an unintentional printing error and the opposing party did not raise timely objections. The Supreme Court, upon reconsideration, granted the petition, setting aside the dismissal resolutions and ordering the Court of Appeals to proceed with the case on its merits.
Issue(s)
Whether the dismissal of the petitioners' appeal by the Court of Appeals was proper despite the alleged omission in the printed joint record on appeal. Whether the failure of the printed joint record on appeal to show on its face the timeliness of the appeal is a valid ground for dismissal under Section 1 of Rule 50.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal of petitioners are set aside, and the said court is ordered to proceed with the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the merits thereof.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the dismissal of the appeal due to omission in the printed record on appeal: The Court held that the dismissal by the Court of Appeals was improper. While it is true that the printed joint record on appeal did not include the petitioners' notice of appeal, the original record on appeal, which was also before the appellate court, contained the notice of appeal and the official receipt of payment for the appeal bond. The Court emphasized that the purpose of printing the record on appeal is for convenience, and the appellate court can examine the original record on appeal to ascertain the timeliness of the appeal. The Court cited Design Masters, Inc. vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., stating that the printed record on appeal is not indispensable to the jurisdiction of the appellate courts and that the Court of Appeals is in a position to determine the date of filing by examining the original record on appeal. On the timeliness of the appeal and compliance with Section 6, Rule 41: The Court found that the petitioners' notice of appeal, dated June 11, 1970, and the request for a 30-day extension to submit the record on appeal, which was granted, were present in the original record on appeal. The Court reasoned that Section 6 of Rule 41 refers to the record on appeal filed with the trial court, not necessarily the printed one filed with the appellate court. The omission in printing was attributed to an unintentional error of the printing press, and the private respondents did not deny this assertion. The Court also noted that under Section 7 of Rule 46, it is the appellee who is called upon to check the printed record on appeal and state objections within thirty days, and the absence of such objection could be taken into account. Although the petitioners' counsel was not blameless for not checking the printed record, the Court opted to be considerate due to the circumstances and the plausibility of the explanation, prioritizing the interests of justice and equity.
Main Doctrine
An omission in the printing of a joint record on appeal, if due to an unintentional error of the printing press and the original record on appeal filed with the trial court is complete and complies with the rules, should not be a ground for dismissal, especially if the appellee did not timely object to the printed record on appeal. The appellate court should consider the original record on appeal.