Bustamante v. Maceren
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Danilo Bustamante was accused of murder. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty and was sentenced by Judge Jorge Coquia to one year imprisonment, with incomplete self-defense and three other mitigating circumstances considered. A commitment order was issued the same day, and petitioner began serving his sentence. Procedural History: Three days later, the Provincial Fiscal filed a motion for modification of penalty. Petitioner's counsel then filed a motion to withdraw the plea of guilty. Judge Coquia granted the motion to withdraw the plea, set aside the judgment of December 14, 1970, and ordered the case to be tried on the merits. Judge Coquia was later transferred, and the case was reassigned to Judge Maximo Maceren. Petitioner was re-arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and a new trial was held. Judge Maceren rendered a new judgment on February 28, 1972, convicting petitioner of homicide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day to twelve years and one day. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing double jeopardy. Judge Maceren opined he lacked authority to nullify Judge Coquia's order and that only a higher court could do so. The Petition: Petitioner filed a suit for certiorari, seeking to nullify Judge Coquia's order setting aside the judgment and Judge Maceren's subsequent decision, and praying for his release, noting he had already served the original one-year sentence.
Issue(s)
Whether the reopening of the case and the subsequent conviction by Judge Maceren, after the petitioner had already pleaded guilty, been convicted, and commenced serving his sentence, violates the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Whether the judgment of conviction rendered by Judge Coquia had become final and executory, precluding any modification or setting aside by the court.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is granted. The order of Judge Coquia dated December 21, 1970, setting aside the judgment of December 14, 1970, and the decision of respondent Judge Maceren dated February 28, 1972, are set aside and declared null and void. Petitioner, having fully served his valid sentence of December 14, 1970, is ordered released forthwith.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of double jeopardy: The Court held that the petitioner was indeed placed in double jeopardy. The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy is clear: "No Person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." In this case, the petitioner was arraigned on a valid information, pleaded guilty, and a judgment of conviction was rendered. Crucially, he was committed to jail and actually started serving his sentence on the same day the judgment was promulgated. This constituted the commencement of the execution of a valid sentence. The subsequent order by Judge Coquia setting aside this judgment, after it had been partially or totally satisfied by the petitioner serving his sentence, was a defiance of a constitutional command. The Court reiterated the principle that once a sentence has been executed, the court loses jurisdiction to modify or set it aside, and any attempt to do so would punish the accused twice for the same offense. The fact that the petitioner may have contributed to the situation by withdrawing his plea of guilty did not forfeit his right to the protection afforded by the jeopardy clause, as the Constitution does not countenance such a step. The Court emphasized that the state, as the dispenser of justice, should not subject an individual to greater or other punishment than the law allows, and that the rights of the accused are sacred and must be strictly regarded. On the finality of the judgment: The Court affirmed that the judgment of conviction rendered by Judge Coquia on December 14, 1970, had become final and executory. According to the Rules of Court (then Rule 120, Section 7, formerly Section 7 of Rule 116), a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal." In this case, the petitioner began serving his sentence on the very same day the judgment was promulgated, thereby satisfying the condition for finality. Consequently, the court lost its competence to modify or set aside the judgment. The Court cited Gregorio v. Director of Prisons and De Leon v. Hon. Rodriguez to support the principle that once a sentence has been served, the judgment becomes final and cannot be reopened. Even the Supreme Court itself, after the finality of a judgment, is devoid of competence to modify or reverse it, as established in People v. Quebral and People v. Sanchez. The withdrawal of the plea of guilty, made after the sentence had commenced to be served, could not revive the court's jurisdiction to set aside a final judgment, especially when the issue of double jeopardy was raised before the new judgment was rendered.
Main Doctrine
Once a judgment of conviction has been promulgated and the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal, the judgment becomes final and can no longer be modified or set aside by the court rendering it, nor can the case be reopened for a new trial, as doing so would place the accused in double jeopardy.