Villegas v. Enrile
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Antonio J. Villegas, then City Mayor of Manila, sought to exercise the power of appointment over subordinate personnel in the City Fiscal's Office, contending that the Decentralization Act (Republic Act No. 5185) granted him this authority. He requested plantilla and service records from the City Fiscal to facilitate these appointments. Procedural History: The City Fiscal denied the Mayor's request, citing an opinion from the Secretary of Justice which held that the power to appoint personnel in the City Fiscal's Office remained with the Secretary of Justice, not the City Mayor. The Secretary of Justice subsequently issued appointments to several individuals for positions in the City Fiscal's Office, which were approved by the Civil Service Commissioner and paid from city funds. The Petition: Petitioner filed a certiorari and prohibition proceeding, asserting that Section 4 of the Decentralization Act vested the power of appointment in him as City Mayor, superseding the City Charter. He argued that the Secretary of Justice's appointments were contrary to the Decentralization Act.
Issue(s)
Whether the power to appoint subordinate personnel in the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, whose salaries are paid from city funds, was transferred from the Secretary of Justice to the City Mayor by virtue of Section 4 of the Decentralization Act (Republic Act No. 5185).
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The power to appoint personnel in the Office of the City Fiscal remains vested in the Secretary of Justice, as provided by the City Charter of Manila, and was not repealed by the Decentralization Act.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the power to appoint subordinate personnel in the Office of the City Fiscal was not transferred from the Secretary of Justice to the City Mayor. Prior to the Decentralization Act, Sangalang v. Vergara had already established that under the Charter of the City of Manila (Republic Act No. 409), such appointments were vested in the Secretary of Justice, citing Section 79(D) of the Revised Administrative Code. The Court emphasized that Section 4 of the Decentralization Act, while enumerating certain city officials whose appointment would be by the City Mayor, explicitly contains a proviso excluding the City Fiscal from this expanded authority. Therefore, the very text of the Decentralization Act cited by the petitioner does not support his contention. Moreover, the Court reiterated the long-standing doctrine that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be declared unless a clear and convincing legislative intent for such repeal is manifest, as established in cases like United States v. Reyes. In this instance, no such manifest indication of a legislative purpose to repeal the Secretary of Justice's appointing power over the City Fiscal's subordinates could be found, especially with the explicit exclusion in Section 4. The Court also relied on Estrella v. Orendain, which underscored that fiscals, while performing quasi-judicial acts, fundamentally belong to the executive department and fall under the general supervision and control of the Department of Justice, consistent with the President's constitutional power of control (Article VII, Section 10 of the 1935 Constitution) and duty to faithfully execute laws. To transfer such appointing power to the Mayor would dislocate the administrative machinery and impair the Secretary of Justice's essential supervisory and control functions as the President's principal alter ego in the prosecution of crimes.
Main Doctrine
The Decentralization Act (Republic Act No. 5185) did not repeal the provisions of the City Charter of Manila (Republic Act No. 409) regarding the appointment of personnel in the Office of the City Fiscal, which power remains vested in the Secretary of Justice.