Fuentes v. Bautista
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Remedios T. Fuentes leased her property at 2443 Park Avenue, Pasay City, to respondent Patricia Lizares and her husband, Antonio Garcia, on a month-to-month basis. The lessees allegedly became P6,305.00 in arrears for rentals as of May 31, 1966. Procedural History: Petitioner filed an unlawful detainer case against the spouses in the Pasay City Court. Summons was served on their overseer, who delivered it to respondent Lizares. Lizares opposed a motion to declare them in default, arguing improper service and that they resided elsewhere. The motion was denied. Lizares then filed a motion to dismiss, reiterating jurisdictional grounds, which was also denied, but she was given five days to answer. She filed an answer admitting the lease but denying current residency in Pasay City, claiming residence in Negros Occidental. She also raised affirmative defenses regarding jurisdiction and payment of rentals, and a counterclaim for attorney's fees. Petitioner moved for a partial summary judgment, which Lizares opposed. After trial, the City Court rendered a decision on December 27, 1966, ordering Lizares to pay P6,370.00 in back rentals and costs, and dismissing her counterclaim. Petitioner's motion to include Antonio Garcia in the judgment was denied. Lizares filed a notice of appeal, paid the docket fee, and posted an appeal bond, but did not file a supersedeas bond. The records were elevated to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, Branch III, as Civil Case No. 2866-P. The Petition: Petitioner filed a motion for execution in the CFI, arguing that the judgment was immediately executory due to the failure to post a supersedeas bond. Lizares opposed, arguing the CFI only had jurisdiction to dismiss the case due to alleged lack of jurisdiction by the City Court over Antonio Garcia. The respondent Judge denied the motion for execution and held the motion to dismiss in abeyance. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration, emphasizing the mandatory nature of the supersedeas bond, was also denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus.
Issue(s)
Whether the Pasay City Court acquired valid jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants. Whether the Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for execution despite the failure of the defendant-appellant to post a supersedeas bond.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the questioned orders and directing the respondent Judge to issue a writ of execution.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court ruled that the Pasay City Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the defendants through substituted service under Rule 14, Section 8. The Court emphasized that a plaintiff is only required to know the defendant’s dwelling house or residence at the time of filing, and service on a person of suitable age and discretion therein—such as the overseer—is valid. Applying Montalban v. Maximo, the law presumes that the person receiving the summons will communicate it to the defendant, and the defendant's actual receipt of the papers from the maid on August 7, 1966, confirmed the effectiveness of the notice. Furthermore, by filing an answer with a counterclaim for damages, respondent Lizares voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction. Under the principle of continuing jurisdiction as seen in Insurance Company of North America v. United States Lines Co., once the court acquired jurisdiction, it remained until the termination of the case, regardless of the defendants' subsequent relocation. On Issue 2: The Court held that the Respondent Judge's denial of the motion for execution was a grave abuse of discretion because the requirement for a supersedeas bond under Rule 70, Section 8 is mandatory and imperative. The purpose of the bond is to secure the payment of rents, damages, and costs adjudged in the appealed judgment, which in this case amounted to P6,370.00. The Court clarified that execution in an ejectment case is not solely for the restoration of property but also for the collection of adjudged rentals, as established in Acierto v. Laperal. Citing Acibo v. Macadaeg and De la Cruz v. Burgos, the Court reiterated that when the supersedeas bond is not filed, the duty to order execution is ministerial, and the judge has no legal basis to dispense with it. Therefore, the fact that the respondents had already vacated the premises did not excuse the failure to post the bond, as the monetary portion of the judgment remained unsatisfied and stayable only by the required security.
Main Doctrine
The failure to file a supersedeas bond in an unlawful detainer case appealed to the Court of First Instance renders the judgment of the inferior court immediately executory, and the court's duty to issue the writ of execution becomes ministerial.