Buendia v. City of Baguio
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Petitioners, city judges of Baguio and Butuan, questioned the ruling of the respondent Auditor General, based on an opinion from the Secretary of Justice, which fixed their annual salaries at P16,800.00. This ruling was predicated on the proviso in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 5967, stating that the salary of a city judge shall be at least P100.00 per month less than that of the city mayor (who received P18,000.00 per annum). The city councils had previously passed resolutions fixing the judges' salaries at P19,000.00 per annum, which were paid until the Auditor General's Memorandum reverted them to P16,800.00. 2. Procedural History: Petitioners filed their respective petitions seeking to set aside the Auditor General's ruling and to prohibit its enforcement. The petitions were filed in March 1971 and September 1971, respectively. 3. The Petition: Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition to nullify the Auditor General's decision and to compel the respondents to recognize their entitlement to the higher salary.
Issue(s)
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to entertain the appeals of city judges from the adverse ruling of the Auditor General. Whether the proviso in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 5967 prevails over the general provision regarding the salary of city judges. Whether the petitions for mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition are proper in this case.
Ruling
The petitions are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The adverse decision of the respondent Auditor General is appealable to the President of the Philippines and not directly to the Supreme Court, as the petitioners, being public officers, are not private parties or entities entitled to such direct appeal under the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 327. No costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: The Court reiterated its ruling in PEMA (Philnabank Employees Association) vs. Auditor General that public officers and employees are not private persons or entities who can appeal the Auditor General's adverse decisions directly to the Supreme Court. Under the 1935 Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 327, such appeals must be filed with the President, whose action is final. The petitions were filed in 1971, thus governed by these provisions. The Court noted that the 1973 Constitution introduced a change allowing direct appeals to the Supreme Court from the Commission on Audit, but this was not applicable to the present cases. On the interpretation of Republic Act No. 5967: While the Court did not definitively rule on the interpretation of the proviso in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 5967 due to the jurisdictional issue, it acknowledged the respondent Auditor General's reliance on the Secretary of Justice's opinion. This opinion held that the proviso, which mandated the city judge's salary to be at least P100.00 per month less than the city mayor's salary, prevailed over the general salary rate fixed in the Act. The Court recognized that the primary purpose of a proviso is to limit or restrain the general language of a statute, and it often reflects the latest expression of legislative intent. On the propriety of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition: The Court found that the acts complained of were within the competence and jurisdiction of the respondent Auditor General. Furthermore, no clear and imperative duty on the part of the Auditor General to perform the acts required by the petitioners was shown. Therefore, the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus were not properly available in these cases.
Main Doctrine
Public officers and employees, such as city judges, are not considered private parties or entities entitled to appeal an adverse decision of the Auditor General directly to the Supreme Court. Such appeals must be taken to the President, whose action is final, unless the case involves a question of constitutionality or a clear and imperative duty on the part of the Auditor General.