Ong Ching v. Ramolete
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Ong Ching, as lessee, filed a complaint against private respondents, the owners of the leased property, seeking damages for refusal to renew the lease agreement for another fifteen (15) years and an injunction to prevent the sale of the land without annotating the lease agreement. The lease contract was executed on October 23, 1953, and revised on February 15, 1965. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissed petitioner's complaint, ordered him to vacate the premises, surrender possession, remove improvements, and pay rentals from October 24, 1968, plus attorney's fees and costs. Petitioner received the judgment on April 18, 1972. On May 18, 1972, Atty. Higinio Hermosisima filed a motion for reconsideration on behalf of petitioner, arguing that the lease was renewable under the same terms and conditions and that the court lacked jurisdiction over the defendants' counterclaim for ejectment. Respondents opposed, asserting the motion was invalid due to the lack of formal substitution of counsel and that the court had jurisdiction. On July 24, 1972, the trial court denied the motion, ruling that the motion had no legal effect as it was filed by a new counsel without proper substitution, thus the judgment was final and a writ of execution was granted. On July 31, 1972, the sheriff proceeded to levy on petitioner's properties. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction to annul the order denying the motion for reconsideration and granting the writ of execution. A temporary restraining order was issued.
Issue(s)
Whether the filing of the motion for reconsideration by Atty. Hermosisima suspended the running of the period to appeal. Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to order the petitioner to vacate the premises and surrender possession.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is dismissed. The order denying the motion for reconsideration and granting the writ of execution is upheld.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether the filing of the motion for reconsideration suspended the running of the period to appeal: The Court held that the filing of the motion for reconsideration by Atty. Hermosisima did suspend the running of the period to appeal. The Court clarified that this was not a substitution of attorneys but the employment of an additional counsel. It is presumed that an attorney appearing in court has sufficient authority, and the appearance of a second attorney does not automatically imply the withdrawal of the first. In this case, Atty. Vasquez, the counsel of record, affirmed his continued connection with the case and authorized Atty. Hermosisima to collaborate due to his ill health. While formal written appearance is desirable, its absence does not render the pleading filed by the collaborating counsel without legal effect. The Court cited Tan Lua v. O'Brien, et al. and Aznar v. Norris in support of the principle that a party may have multiple lawyers working in collaboration. Therefore, the motion for reconsideration was valid and did suspend the appeal period. On the issue of whether the trial court had jurisdiction to order the petitioner to vacate the premises and surrender possession: The Court ruled that the trial court had jurisdiction. The petitioner himself invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court by filing an action seeking affirmative relief regarding the lease renewal and possession. Having sought relief from the court, he could not later question its jurisdiction after the court ruled against him. The order to vacate was a logical consequence of the court's declaration that the lease had expired and was not lawfully renewed. The Court reiterated the principle that while jurisdiction may be challenged at any time, public policy bars a party from questioning jurisdiction after having invoked it and speculated on the outcome of the litigation, citing Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al. and Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals.
Main Doctrine
A motion for reconsideration filed by an additional collaborating counsel, even without a formal substitution of the counsel of record, suspends the running of the period to appeal, provided there is no indication that the original counsel was replaced and the original counsel affirms his continued connection with the case. Furthermore, a party who invokes the jurisdiction of a court to seek affirmative relief cannot later question that same jurisdiction after failing to obtain the desired relief.