In re De Guzman
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An administrative case was initiated against Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman following a resolution from the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila in Civil Case No. 71648. The CFI decision, rendered by Judge Jesus de Veyra, set aside a City Court judgment in Civil Case No. 165187 (Floro v. Lapatha) and remanded the case to the City Court, ordering that Atty. de Guzman be investigated for his conduct. Procedural History: In Civil Case No. 165187, Vicente Floro filed an ejectment case against Lagrimas Lapatha. A decision was rendered by the City Court, Branch VIII, on November 2, 1967, ordering the defendant to vacate the premises and pay rentals and attorney's fees, based on a confession of judgment. Lagrimas Lapatha subsequently filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the CFI of Manila, alleging that she appeared without counsel at the initial hearing, verbally agreed with Atty. de Guzman for a postponement, signed the expediente at his request, and later discovered that "CONFESS JUDGMENT" was written above her signature without her knowledge or consent. She also claimed to have made partial payment of rentals to Atty. de Guzman. Vicente Floro, in his Answer, asserted that Lapatha admitted the indebtedness in open court, leading to the confession of judgment, and that payments were made to forestall execution. He also noted that Lapatha agreed to vacate by January 15, 1968, but failed to do so. The Petition: The CFI, through Judge de Veyra, rendered a decision favorable to Lapatha, finding that Atty. de Guzman committed "machinations unworthy of an attorney" by agreeing to a postponement, accepting partial payment, and then causing a confession of judgment to be entered without Lapatha's consent, thus depriving her of her day in court. The CFI decision was based on the testimonies of Lapatha and Atty. Vargas. The Supreme Court, upon receiving a copy of this decision, required Atty. de Guzman to answer, and the matter was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation.
Issue(s)
Whether Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman committed deceit or misconduct in his behavior during the proceedings before the City Court of Manila in Civil Case No. 165187. Whether the evidence presented sufficiently establishes that Atty. de Guzman deprived Lagrimas Lapatha of her day in court through "machinations unworthy of an attorney."
Ruling
The administrative complaint against Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman is dismissed, and he is exonerated of the charge.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether Atty. Felizardo M. de Guzman committed deceit or misconduct: The Supreme Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the findings of the CFI, particularly those based on the testimonies of Lagrimas Lapatha and Atty. Vargas, were unsubstantiated during the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General's Office. The Court noted that neither Lapatha nor Atty. Vargas appeared at the hearing before the Solicitor General despite due notice, and their testimonies were satisfactorily controverted by the evidence submitted by the respondent attorney. The testimony of the City Court clerk, who stated that both Lapatha and Atty. de Guzman appeared, and Lapatha admitted the indebtedness in open court, leading to the "confessed judgment" written on the expediente and signed by both parties, was given credit. This testimony was substantiated by the City Judge's decision, and the judge is presumed to have performed his official duty regularly. Furthermore, the P350.00 check was given as partial payment of arrears after the hearing, not to secure a postponement, and was intended to forestall immediate execution. The Court also pointed out that Lapatha agreed to vacate the premises by January 15, 1968, and Atty. de Guzman waived collection of rentals for the intervening months, indicating a compromise rather than deceit. The subsequent compromise agreement to vacate by October 31, 1968, further suggested that Lapatha's primary objective was to gain more time in the premises, not that she was a victim of deceit. Therefore, the evidence was found wanting to sustain a finding of deceit or misconduct. On the issue of whether Atty. de Guzman deprived Lagrimas Lapatha of her day in court through "machinations unworthy of an attorney": The Court found that the evidence did not support the CFI's conclusion of "machinations unworthy of an attorney." The clerk of court's testimony indicated that Lapatha appeared in court, admitted the indebtedness, and signed the confession of judgment. The CFI's reliance on Atty. Vargas's testimony was weakened because Vargas was not present at the hearing and his account was based on hearsay from his secretary. The partial payment and subsequent agreement to vacate by a certain date, as well as the final compromise agreement, demonstrated a course of conduct that did not necessarily involve deceit by Atty. de Guzman. The Court reiterated the principle that in disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is on the complainant, and charges must be established by convincing proof. The presumption of innocence and the requirement of a clear preponderance of evidence against the attorney were emphasized. Given the lack of convincing proof and the controverting evidence, the charge was not substantiated.
Main Doctrine
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the charge against a lawyer must be established by convincing proof, free from doubt, to warrant the exercise of the Court's disciplinary powers. A lawyer is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved by a clear preponderance of evidence.