People v. Manlapaz

G.R. No. L-27259 · 1974-02-27 · J. FERNANDO, J.: · Primary: Criminal; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: The case involves the killing of Diogenes Esquilona. The deceased, after drinking tuba with Leonardo Manlapaz, Iluminado Padre, Marcelino Campo, and Antonio Maglente, became belligerent and struck appellant Manlapaz and his wife for failing to provide fried chicken as pulutan. On the way home, the deceased was accosted from behind by Manlapaz and stabbed with a bolo. The deceased sustained five fatal wounds. The wife of the deceased testified that after Manlapaz stabbed her husband, Iluminado Padre and Marcelino Campo also approached the victim and struck him with bolos while he was on the ground. Manlapaz then allegedly returned and severed the victim's right hand. Procedural History: The lower court convicted the accused Leonardo Manlapaz, Iluminado Padre, and Marcelino Campo of murder and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. The Petition: The defendants-appellants sought reversal of the lower court's decision, with Manlapaz claiming self-defense and Padre and Campo asserting their innocence.

Issue(s)

Whether Leonardo Manlapaz acted in self-defense. Whether treachery attended the commission of the crime. Whether Iluminado Padre and Marcelino Campo are guilty of the crime. Whether the crime committed was murder or homicide.

Ruling

The Supreme Court modified the lower court's decision. Leonardo Manlapaz was convicted of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day to fourteen years, two months, and one day, with an indemnity of P12,000.00 to the heirs of the victim. The conviction of Iluminado Padre and Marcelino Campo was reversed, and they were acquitted.

Ratio Decidendi

On the issue of self-defense for Leonardo Manlapaz: The Court held that the plea of self-defense was not tenable. The requisites for self-defense, namely unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation, were not sufficiently proven by the accused. The number and nature of the wounds inflicted on the deceased contradicted the claim of self-defense. Furthermore, Manlapaz's own testimony admitted to inflicting the wounds, and his assertion of peril to his life lacked solidity and persuasiveness. The Court found the widow's version, which indicated no real peril to the victim's life, to be more in accordance with the transpired events. On the presence of treachery: The Court ruled that treachery did not characterize the offense. While the widow imputed a sudden, unprovoked attack, the defense's version, which the Court found to have the ring of truth, indicated that the deceased provoked Manlapaz by striking him and his wife. Under these circumstances, the victim should have been sufficiently forewarned of a possible reprisal, thus negating the element of a sudden, unprovoked attack indicative of treachery. On the guilt of Iluminado Padre and Marcelino Campo: The Court found that the guilt of appellants Padre and Campo was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The Court gave credence to the victim's declaration immediately after the incident, which named only Leonardo Manlapaz as his assailant. This declaration was made in the presence of the barrio captain and a rural policeman, who were relatives of the victim, making it improbable that he would have trifled with the truth. Additionally, the testimony of Antonio Maglente, an eyewitness, explicitly contradicted the widow's version and stated that Padre and Campo had no involvement in the stabbing. The corroboration by a young witness, Merlita Padre, further supported Maglente's testimony, making the conviction of Padre and Campo indefensible. On the classification of the crime: The Court concluded that the crime committed was homicide, not murder. This was due to the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The unlawful aggression initiated by the deceased, coupled with the lack of treachery, led to the classification of the offense as homicide. The Court also noted that the burden of proof for self-defense rests on the accused, and this burden was not met by Manlapaz.

Main Doctrine

The claim of self-defense requires the presence of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation, with the burden of proof resting on the accused. Treachery is not present when the victim's actions indicate provocation and the accused's reprisal, while unlawful, does not arise from a sudden, unprovoked attack. The guilt of co-accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, and their acquittal is warranted if evidence is insufficient.

Access audio review, related cases, codal links, and more.

Open LexMatePH →