Samson v. City Mayor of Bacolod City
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiffs-appellees, Elisa Samson and Angel Gavilan, were movie operators in Bacolod City. They filed a complaint to nullify Bacolod City Ordinance No. 1074 (1967), which amended Ordinance No. 108 (1960). The amendatory ordinance made it unlawful for any proprietor, lessee, or operator of an amusement place to admit two or more persons with only one admission ticket. Procedural History: The plaintiffs alleged that Ordinance No. 1074 was ultra vires and contrary to the due process provision of the Constitution, as it deprived them of their property without due process by limiting their right to manage their theaters as they wished. They sought an injunction, which was granted. The City Fiscal filed an answer. The lower court, relying on the parties' memoranda and without evidence, declared the ordinance null and void for being in contravention of the Constitution, considering it an unwarranted interference with business management under the guise of police power. The Petition: The defendants-appellants appealed the decision of the lower court, arguing that the court should have respected prior Supreme Court decisions and that the lower court erred in nullifying the ordinance without sufficient factual basis and in disregard of the presumption of validity.
Issue(s)
Whether the lower court erred in nullifying Bacolod City Ordinance No. 1074 without requiring the plaintiffs to present evidence to overcome the presumption of validity. Whether Bacolod City Ordinance No. 1074, which prohibits admitting two or more persons with a single admission ticket in amusement places, violates the due process clause of the Constitution.
Ruling
The appealed decision of November 22, 1967, declaring Bacolod City Ordinance No. 1074, series of 1967, null and void, is reversed and set aside. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by the lower court on June 30, 1967, is likewise set aside and declared to be bereft of any force or effect. Costs are against the plaintiffs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the presumption of validity and the requirement of evidence: The lower court erred in nullifying the ordinance without requiring the plaintiffs to present evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. The Supreme Court reiterated the doctrine that the burden of demonstrating the alleged nullity of an ordinance rests on the party assailing its infirmity. This principle, dating back to United States v. Salaveria, was emphasized in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor, where it was stated that the action of elected representatives cannot be lightly set aside and that the judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action without a clear invasion of rights. The lower court's decision was based solely on memoranda, not on a factual foundation of record, thus the presumption of validity must prevail. On the issue of due process and police power: Even assuming a decision on the merits, the lower court's finding of a due process violation was erroneous. The Supreme Court held that the assertion of undue interference with property rights, as alleged by the plaintiffs, was a superficial claim that ought not to have merited serious consideration. The principle, as articulated in Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, states that a reliance on possible adverse effects on property rights does not suffice for a declaration of unconstitutionality under the due process clause. The Court further cited United States v. Abendan and Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, emphasizing that the police power, exercised through the general welfare clause, allows for regulation of businesses in the interest of public health, safety, morals, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, prosperity, and general welfare. The ordinance in question, by preventing fraud concerning municipal taxes and promoting public health, safety, and general welfare, falls within the legitimate exercise of police power.
Main Doctrine
An ordinance enacted under the police power is presumed valid, and the burden rests on the party assailing its constitutionality to present evidence to rebut this presumption. A mere assertion of undue interference with property rights does not suffice to declare an ordinance void under the due process clause.