National Shipyards and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: A strike was staged on November 5, 1956, by the National Shipyards Employees and Workers Association (NASEWA). An amicable settlement was reached, including the reinstatement of union president Melanio Capillan and payment of his backwages. A partial decision was rendered on July 29, 1957, enjoining compliance with the agreement. Procedural History: NASEWA moved for Capillan's reinstatement and backwages, and for contempt due to petitioner's refusal. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ordered reinstatement and backwages on November 13, 1958, but the writ was unsatisfied. The CIR denied contempt on May 30, 1959, finding NASSCO justified in refusing reinstatement due to Capillan's conviction for slight physical injuries. Capillan was granted an absolute and unconditional pardon on March 1, 1963, restoring his civil and political rights. Capillan again moved for reinstatement and backwages on May 7, 1963, which was denied on September 12, 1963, due to the lapse of three years. On May 23, 1964, the CIR granted a motion for execution of the November 13, 1958 order, providing for reinstatement with backwages from March 1, 1963, until actual reinstatement. This was affirmed en banc. This Court, in a decision dated May 4, 1968, affirmed the CIR's order, rejecting NASSCO's contention that previous orders had modified the reinstatement right. After this decision became final, Capillan moved for execution, which was granted on November 7, 1968. NASSCO moved for reconsideration, claiming compliance with backwages and Capillan's refusal to be reinstated. The CIR remanded the case for evidence reception. The trial judge, in an order dated December 17, 1969, found that Capillan received P12,111.60 in backwages up to July 25, 1968, and was entitled to backwages from that date until actual reinstatement. The judge also found that Capillan had reported for work in Manila as instructed and that NASSCO's claim of tuberculosis was not a bar to employment. The CIR en banc affirmed this on March 7, 1970. Subsequently, on August 28, 1970, the CIR issued an order directing Capillan's reinstatement, noting the agreement of both parties on his reinstatement at the Manila office. NASSCO moved for reconsideration, which was denied on September 23, 1970. The Petition: NASSCO filed petitions for review questioning the CIR's orders of December 17, 1969, March 7, 1970, August 28, 1970, and September 23, 1970, arguing they were contrary to evidence, law, and jurisprudence, and that the pardon did not restore a forfeited office. The Court consolidated these cases.
Issue(s)
Whether the matter of Melanio Capillan's reinstatement and backwages is already barred by the doctrine of Law of the Case and Res Judicata. Whether the absolute pardon granted to Capillan restored his right to his former position despite his prior conviction for slight physical injuries. Whether Capillan's act of reporting to the Mariveles station instead of Manila constituted a waiver of his right to reinstatement.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders and resolutions of the Court of Industrial Relations, subject to modifications regarding the computation and payment of additional backwages and the conditions for reinstatement.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court ruled that the right to reinstatement and backwages was settled with finality in the Supreme Court's decision of May 4, 1968. Under the doctrine of Law of the Case, questions once settled by the appellate court in a specific case between the same parties are binding in all subsequent stages of that same controversy. NASSCO's attempts to re-litigate the legality of the reinstatement are palpably untenable and constitute a resistance to a final and executory judgment. The Court emphasized that NASSCO had obstinately blocked Capillan's reinstatement for years, resulting in the accrual of massive backwages. Therefore, the CIR did not err in enforcing a right that was already recognized and affirmed by the highest court of the land. Reopening these issues would violate the principle of Res Judicata and the finality of judgments. On Issue 2: The Court held that Capillan's conviction for slight physical injuries did not result in the forfeiture of his office. According to Article 44 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of arresto menor only carries the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence. Upon serving the 20-day sentence, the suspension was automatically lifted even without executive clemency. Furthermore, the absolute pardon granted by the President served as a reiteration of the termination of said suspension and erased all doubts regarding his reinstatement. Regarding NASSCO's claim that the position was abolished, the Court noted that this defense should have been raised in the first case and is now barred. The Court also found it highly incredible that among hundreds of positions, only the union president's specific position as a semi-skilled laborer was allegedly abolished. On Issue 3: The Court found no merit in the claim that Capillan waived his reinstatement by reporting to the wrong station. It is axiomatic in Philippine jurisprudence that a waiver must be express and cannot be lightly inferred from flimsy premises, such as reporting to a different branch office. Capillan's repeated and insistent legal motions for execution of the judgment for his reinstatement clearly evidenced his intent to return to work. The record also shows that in open court, both parties had previously manifested their agreement to the Manila reinstatement. Consequently, NASSCO's refusal to accept him when he reported to Mariveles was an act of bad faith intended to delay the enforcement of a final judgment. The Court stressed that immediate reinstatement should have been the priority to minimize damage to both the employer's finances and the employee's livelihood.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the Court of Industrial Relations enforcing the reinstatement and backwages of an employee, holding that the matter was res judicata and that a presidential pardon restored the employee's right to hold office, which had been suspended, not forfeited, by his conviction.