Development Bank v. Tañada
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: In 1951, the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (RFC), predecessor of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), granted Quirico del Mar a P6,000 loan secured by a mortgage. In 1957, del Mar offered a backpay certificate to settle his outstanding obligation, but the RFC refused. Del Mar and Fabian Aliño filed a suit (Civil Case R-5324) to compel the RFC to accept their backpay certificates, which the court granted on May 22, 1958. The RFC discounted the backpay certificate at 2% per annum, which del Mar questioned in another suit (Civil Case R-6455), but the RFC's action was upheld by the Supreme Court on August 8, 1967 (L-22254). In March 1967, DBP initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. Del Mar filed another action (Civil Case R-9880) to restrain the foreclosure and declare his debt fully paid. Procedural History: On May 26, 1970, del Mar filed a motion for execution of the May 22, 1958 judgment in Civil Case R-5324, despite the pendency of Civil Case R-9880. The respondent judge issued an order on July 10, 1970, directing the issuance of an alias writ of execution, stating it was a ministerial duty. The respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration on August 21, 1970. DBP filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. The Petition: DBP sought to nullify the orders dated July 10, 1970, and August 21, 1970, and to restrain the enforcement of the order directing execution.
Issue(s)
Whether the motion for execution filed on May 26, 1970, for a judgment rendered on May 22, 1958, was filed within the prescriptive period under Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Whether the judgment in Civil Case R-5324 was a definitive and executory judgment.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari, declared the orders of the respondent judge dated July 10, 1970, and August 21, 1970, null and void, and made permanent the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued, enjoining the enforcement of the said orders. Costs were against the respondent Quirico del Mar.
Ratio Decidendi
On the enforceability of the judgment by motion: The Court held that Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides two periods for execution: within five years from the date the judgment becomes final and executory by motion, and thereafter, by ordinary civil action before the ten-year prescriptive period sets in. The respondent filed his motion for execution on May 26, 1970, more than twelve years after the judgment in Civil Case R-5324 became final and executory on May 22, 1958. Therefore, the motion for execution was filed beyond the five-year period and was already barred by prescription. The Court emphasized that actions taken by the prevailing party, dilatory or otherwise, do not interrupt or extend the five-year limitation period for execution by motion. On whether the judgment was definitive and executory: The Court found that the judgment in Civil Case R-5324, which ordered the RFC to accept the backpay certificates of the respondent and Aliño, was a definitive judgment. It resolved the sole issue of whether Republic Act 897 imposed an obligation on the RFC to accept such certificates. The dispositive portion specifically granted the remedy sought by the parties. The Court rejected the respondent's argument that the determination of the amount chargeable against the backpay certificate constituted a separate issue that made the judgment incomplete. The Court noted that the respondent himself considered the judgment final and executory when he sought an initial writ of execution on November 13, 1958. His subsequent refusal to negotiate the certificate on its discounted value did not affect the finality or executory nature of the judgment.
Main Doctrine
A motion for execution of a judgment filed more than twelve years after it became final and executory is barred by prescription under Section 6 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which limits execution by motion to within five years from finality, and requires an ordinary civil action thereafter.