Cornejo v. Secretary of Justice
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Crisanto Cornejo was appointed Special Counsel of Pasay City on April 4, 1960. In December 1963, an administrative complaint for dishonesty and willful failure to pay debts was filed against him. An investigation led to a decision by the Commissioner of Civil Service on May 19, 1966, finding him guilty and considering him resigned, effective on his last day of duty with pay. Respondent Adelino A. Sanchez was appointed Special Counsel on July 1, 1966, to the position deemed vacated by petitioner's dismissal. Procedural History: Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on September 17, 1966, alleging denial of due process and lack of evidence. On March 7, 1969, the Commissioner of Civil Service set aside the May 19, 1966 decision and ordered a new investigation due to denial of due process in the original investigation. Pending reinvestigation, petitioner sought reinstatement. A reinvestigation recommended petitioner's exoneration and dismissal of the case. The Commissioner of Civil Service, on April 22, 1970, granted petitioner's request for reinstatement. However, the Secretary of Justice, on June 16, 1970, considered the case closed, citing the untimeliness of the motion for reconsideration and abandonment of office. Petitioner received P1,500.00 for back salaries from April 1 to June 30, 1966. The City Fiscal opined on July 3, 1970, that reinstatement could not be done based on the Secretary of Justice's indorsement. On October 12, 1970, the Commissioner of Civil Service revoked Mr. Sanchez's appointment and reinstated Mr. Cornejo, pending reinvestigation. On November 23, 1970, the Secretary of Justice refused reinstatement, citing finality of the dismissal decision and irrevocability of Sanchez's appointment. The Petition: Petitioner filed the present petition for mandamus on November 23, 1970, seeking reinstatement and back salaries.
Issue(s)
Whether petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Commissioner of Civil Service's decision was timely filed. Whether petitioner was accorded due process of law in the original investigation. Whether the present action was timely filed.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The Court found that the motion for reconsideration was filed out of time, and that petitioner was not denied due process in the original investigation. Furthermore, the petition for quo warranto was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period.
Ratio Decidendi
On the timeliness of the motion for reconsideration: The Court held that the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service became final on July 8, 1966, based on evidence showing petitioner received a copy of the decision on June 8, 1966, through his household via registered mail. The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 17, 1966, which was beyond the thirty-day reglementary period provided by Section 36 of Republic Act No. 2260. Consequently, subsequent proceedings, including the resolution setting aside the original decision, were deemed to have no legal effect. The Court noted that while the Commissioner of Civil Service later stated petitioner received notice on August 18, 1966, this did not obliterate the earlier receipt via mail on June 8, 1966, as evidenced by postal certifications and registry return receipts. The Court also considered the appointment of respondent Sanchez prior to July 1, 1966, as indicative that the Department of Justice had received notice of the decision earlier. On the issue of due process: The Court ruled that petitioner was not denied due process. He failed to elect a formal investigation and did not file an answer to the administrative complaint, despite being furnished a copy and receiving unequivocal indorsements requesting his answer and indicating his option for a formal investigation. The Court emphasized that what is safeguarded is the opportunity to be heard, not necessarily prior notice of each hearing, and that petitioner, by his negligence or indifference, forfeited this opportunity. His presence at one hearing, claimed to be accidental, was contradicted by evidence and his own narration, which suggested prior notification and attendance for the purpose of the hearing. On the timeliness of the action (quo warranto): The Court classified the petition as one for quo warranto, as petitioner sought to recover a public office allegedly usurped by another. Under Section 6 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, such actions must be commenced within one year after the ouster. The Court found that respondent Sanchez was appointed on July 1, 1966. Even if the decision separating petitioner was set aside on March 7, 1969, the petition was filed on November 23, 1970, which is beyond the one-year prescriptive period from March 7, 1969. The pendency of administrative remedies did not suspend the running of this period, citing Torres v. Quintos. Therefore, petitioner lost his right to recover the office.
Main Doctrine
A petition for quo warranto to recover a public office must be filed within one year from the ouster of the petitioner. The pendency of administrative remedies does not suspend the running of this one-year period.