Los Angeles v. Farin
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondents Petra Farin and Benjamin Farin sought to enjoin the foreclosure sale of a property owned by them, which was being foreclosed by petitioner Marcelo Steel Corporation. The trial court had initially issued a status quo order. Procedural History: The trial court eventually lifted the status quo order. The foreclosure sale proceeded, and Marcelo Steel Corporation became the purchaser. The respondents Farins appealed the decision of the trial court. Meanwhile, another certiorari case between the same parties was pending before the Supreme Court (G.R. L-35851). The Petition: This resolution concerns the second motion for reconsideration filed by the movants (respondents Farins) against the Supreme Court's decision dated November 25, 1973. The movants contended that the Supreme Court's decision disregarded the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. They argued that the Sheriff acted irregularly in conducting the foreclosure sale and that the property was in custodia legis due to the status quo order. They also raised the pendency of another case between the parties as a factor affecting the instant cases.
Issue(s)
Whether the Supreme Court's decision disregarded the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. Whether the Sheriff acted irregularly in conducting the foreclosure sale. Whether the property involved was in custodia legis. Whether the pendency of another case between the same parties affects the instant cases. Whether the respondents Farins' appeal from the trial court's decision bars the foreclosure sale and the issuance of a writ of possession.
Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. It held that its decision was based on the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, that the Sheriff acted in accordance with law, that the property was not in custodia legis, that the pendency of another case was irrelevant, and that the appeal did not bar the foreclosure sale and the issuance of a writ of possession.
Ratio Decidendi
On the contention that the Supreme Court's decision disregarded the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals: The Court clarified that its decision was based exclusively on the facts found by the Court of Appeals. The movants failed to point out any specific findings of fact that were ignored. Therefore, this contention was without merit. On the alleged irregularity of the Sheriff's actuations: The Court found no irregularity in the Sheriff's conduct. It held that the Sheriff merely performed his duty under Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118, after the trial court had lifted the status quo order. The movants did not provide any valid reason to reconsider this finding. On whether the property was in custodia legis: The Court ruled that the property was not in custodia legis. It explained that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the property by virtue of the respondents' complaint or the status quo order. The action to enjoin the foreclosure sale was a personal action (in personam), and the status quo order's only sanction was to punish violations, not to place the property under court custody. On the relevance of the pendency of another case (G.R. L-35851): The Court stated that the pendency of another certiorari case between the same parties had no bearing on the issues of the instant cases. The Court reiterated its previous findings on the merits of the foreclosure sale. On whether the appeal bars the foreclosure sale and writ of possession: The Court reiterated its ruling that the respondents' appeal from the trial court's decision was not a bar to the foreclosure sale. Pursuant to De Garcia vs. San Jose, it is implicit in Section 8 of Act 3135 that the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is a ministerial duty of the court. The mortgagor's sole remedy is to question the validity of the sale in the manner provided by law, which involves a summary procedure under Section 112 of the Land Registration Act if filed within thirty days after the purchaser is given possession. Since the private respondents did not follow this procedure, the sale and writ of possession in favor of petitioner Marcelo Steel Corporation must be respected.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court reiterated that a writ of possession in a foreclosure sale is a matter of ministerial duty for the court, and the mortgagor's remedy is to question the validity of the sale itself within the statutory period, not to prevent the issuance of the writ. The Court emphasized that an injunction against foreclosure is a personal action and does not place the property under custodia legis.