Bucton v. Gabar
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiff Nicanora Gabar Bucton (wife of Felix Bucton) and defendant Zosimo Gabar are siblings, and Zosimo is married to defendant Josefina Llamoso Gabar. In 1946, Josefina purchased a parcel of land. She verbally agreed with Nicanora that Nicanora would pay half the price (P3,000) and would own half the land. Nicanora gave Josefina P1,000 on January 19, 1946, evidenced by a receipt (Exhibit A), and P400 on May 2, 1948. Plaintiffs also gave defendants P1,000 as a loan on July 30, 1951, evidenced by a receipt signed by Zosimo (Exhibit E). After the initial payment, plaintiffs took possession of their portion of the land and built houses, eventually constructing a strong materials house with apartments for rent and occupying the upper portion as their residence. In January 1947, the original sellers executed a deed of sale in favor of Josefina, and TCT No. II was issued in her name. Plaintiffs sought a separate title for their portion, but defendants refused, citing a mortgage on the entire land. Plaintiffs continued possessing and developing their portion, and in 1953, with defendants' consent, had the land surveyed and subdivided, after which defendants erected a fence demarcating the portions. Plaintiffs continued to demand a separate title, employing legal counsel, but to no avail, leading to the filing of the present case. Procedural History: The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, ordering the defendants to execute a deed of conveyance for the plaintiffs' portion of the land, directing the Register of Deeds to issue separate titles, and ordering defendants to pay attorney's fees and costs. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, dismissing the complaint on the ground that the action, based on the written receipt (Exhibit A), had prescribed, having been filed more than ten years after the cause of action accrued, as per Article 1144 of the Civil Code. The appellate court also noted that possession of registered land cannot be acquired by prescription. The Petition: Petitioners appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that their action had not prescribed because they were owners by purchase, in actual, continuous, and physical possession of the property since purchase, and their action was to compel the vendors to execute a formal deed of conveyance to inscribe their ownership in the title.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioners' action for specific performance, or to compel the execution of a deed of conveyance, had prescribed. Whether the petitioners' possession of the land, coupled with their claim of ownership, renders their action to quiet title imprescriptible.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and revived the judgment of the trial court. The Court held that the petitioners' action had not prescribed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1 (Prescription of Action): The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the petitioners' action had prescribed. The appellate court's reliance on Article 1144 of the Civil Code, which provides a ten-year prescriptive period for actions based on written contracts, was misplaced. While Exhibit A, the receipt for part payment, was executed in 1946, the Court clarified that the real basis of the petitioners' action was their ownership of one-half of the lot coupled with their possession thereof, which entitled them to a conveyance. The Court distinguished this from a mere action for specific performance of the contract, emphasizing that the delivery of possession had already consummated the sale and transferred title to the purchasers. Therefore, the action was viewed as one to quiet title, aimed at removing the cloud upon their ownership caused by the defendants' refusal to recognize the sale. On Issue 2 (Imprescriptibility of Action to Quiet Title): The Supreme Court reiterated the established rule that an action to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff is imprescriptible. Citing Sapto, et al. v. Fabiana and Gallar v. Husain, et al., the Court explained that as long as the owner remains in actual possession of the land, claiming to be the owner, their right to have their title quieted against adverse claims or liens is not barred by the statute of limitations. This is because the owner has a continuing right to seek aid from the courts to determine the nature of any adverse claim and its effect on their title, or to assert their superior equity. The Court emphasized that this rule applies only when the complainant is in possession, which was the situation of the petitioners in this case. The refusal of the defendants to recognize the sale and execute a deed of conveyance constituted a cloud on the petitioners' ownership, which they had the right to have removed through an action to quiet title, an action that does not prescribe while possession is maintained.
Main Doctrine
An action to quiet title, based on ownership and possession of a property, is imprescriptible, even if the underlying contract of sale may have been executed more than ten years prior to the filing of the suit, provided the plaintiff remains in possession.