Paredes v. Abad

G.R. Nos. L-36927-28, L-37715, L-38331 · 1974-04-15 · J. FERNANDEZ, J.: · Primary: Political; Secondary: Remedial
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: The cases consolidated herein involve election protests filed by petitioners Cresencio Paredes, Venancio Uyan, Belino C. Sunga, and Vicente O. Valley. These protests challenged the election results for various provincial and municipal offices, including Governor of Ifugao, Vice-Governor of Ifugao, Mayor of Masantol, Pampanga, and Governor of Eastern Samar, following the November 8, 1971 elections. The private respondents in these cases were proclaimed as elected and had assumed their positions. 2. Procedural History: The respondent Judges of the Courts of First Instance dismissed the election protests filed by the petitioners. The primary ground for dismissal in each instance was the assertion that Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, concerning the terms of office for elective officials, rendered the protests moot and academic. This dismissal occurred despite the fact that the four-year terms to which the private respondents were elected had not yet expired and the 1971 Election Code provided for a hold-over period. The petitioners are now before this Court seeking certiorari to set aside these dismissal orders. 3. The Petition: The petitioners seek review of the dismissal orders, arguing that the respondent Judges erred in concluding that the New Constitution's provisions on the term of office rendered their election protests moot. They contend that while the Constitution may have made the term indefinite, it did not extinguish their right to challenge the legality of the private respondents' election and their right to hold office. The petitions also raise the issue of the disqualification of Judge Francisco Men Abad due to a strained personal relationship with the petitioners, arguing that his impartiality could be reasonably questioned, thus violating due process. The petitioners assert that existing laws and constitutional provisions allow for the continuation of jurisdiction by existing courts to hear pending cases, including these election protests.

Issue(s)

Whether the dismissal of election protests was proper on the ground that the term of office of the proclaimed winners became indefinite under the New Constitution. Whether the Courts of First Instance retained jurisdiction over election protests for provincial officials after the ratification of the New Constitution, which vested sole jurisdiction in the Commission on Elections. Whether respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad should be disqualified from hearing the election protests in G.R. Nos. L-36927-28.

Ruling

The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal orders, ordered the Courts of First Instance to continue with the trial of the election protests, and declared respondent Judge Francisco Men Abad disqualified from hearing the cases filed by petitioners Cresencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan. Costs were against the private respondents.

Ratio Decidendi

On the dismissal of election protests due to indefinite term: The Court held that the respondent Judges committed a clear error in dismissing the election protests. The principal ground for dismissal, that the protests became moot and academic under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, was untenable. This constitutional provision made the term of office indefinite, but it did not extinguish the right to challenge the legality of the election itself. The Court distinguished between the 'term' of office and the 'right' to hold office, stating that while the term was made indefinite, the right to continue holding the office could still be questioned through an election protest. The indefinite term arose from the proclamation of election, but if the private respondents were not duly elected, they had no right to hold the office, regardless of the indefinite term. The Court emphasized that the Constitutional Convention did not intend to shield unduly elected officials and that the sanctity of the ballot must be preserved. Existing laws, such as Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971, which provided the right to file election contests, remained operative as they were not inconsistent with the New Constitution. On the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance: The Court held that the Courts of First Instance retained jurisdiction over the pending election protests. While Section 2, paragraph 2 of Article XII-C of the New Constitution designated the Commission on Elections as the sole judge of election contests for elective provincial officials, Section 8 of Article XVII (Transitory Provisions) stipulated that all existing courts should continue to exercise their jurisdiction and all pending cases should be heard under the laws then in force. Given that the New Constitution was ratified on January 17, 1973, and the election protests were already pending in the Courts of First Instance, these protests fell under the purview of Section 8, Article XVII. The Court reasoned that the constitutional provision vesting jurisdiction in the COMELEC could not retroactively divest the Courts of First Instance of jurisdiction over cases already filed and pending trial, especially since election protests had strict filing deadlines under the 1971 Election Code, and these protests were filed within those deadlines. On the disqualification of respondent Judge Abad: The Court declared respondent Judge Abad disqualified from hearing the election protests filed by Cresencio Paredes and Venancio Uyan. The petitioners cited reasons such as their opposition to the judge's confirmation, pending criminal charges against him, and his recommendation by one of the protestees. The Court acknowledged that a strained personal relationship likely existed between the petitioners and the respondent Judge, and that not only the petitioners but also their political supporters might lack faith in the judge's impartiality. Citing Pimentel vs. Salanga and Luque vs. Kayanan, the Court stressed the importance of maintaining public faith in the judiciary and the need for judges to conduct self-examination when their impartiality is questioned. While not strictly legally prohibited, the judge should voluntarily inhibit himself when circumstances reasonably capable of inciting bias or prejudice exist. The Court concluded that for the strict observance of due process, Judge Abad's disqualification was necessary to ensure that the parties have full faith, trust, and confidence in the impartiality of the judge.

Main Doctrine

The dismissal of election protests based on the argument that the term of office of proclaimed winners became indefinite under the New Constitution is erroneous, as the right to hold office can still be challenged. Furthermore, a judge who has a strained personal relationship with the petitioners or their supporters is disqualified from hearing the election protest to ensure due process and maintain public faith in the judiciary.

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