J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Estabillo

G.R. No. L-20610 · 1975-01-09 · J. AQUINO, J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Civil
REITERATION

Facts

The Antecedents: J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. (J.M. Tuason) filed a complaint for forcible entry against Antonio Estabillo to eject him from a lot in Quezon City. Summons was served on Estabillo's nephew, who resided with him and was deemed a person of sufficient discretion. Estabillo failed to file an answer within the reglementary period, leading to a default judgment ordering him to vacate the lot and remove his house. Procedural History: J.M. Tuason obtained a writ of execution and an order of demolition. Estabillo, through counsel, filed several motions to declare proceedings void due to alleged improper service of summons and to lift the default judgment, all of which were opposed by J.M. Tuason. Estabillo also argued that the case had become moot due to a compromise agreement concerning the Tatalon Estate and later due to the sale of the lot to a third party, Jose Cua. These motions were consistently denied by the lower court. The Petition: Estabillo appealed from the orders denying his motion to declare the writ of execution moot and the order denying his motion for reconsideration and relief from judgment. He raised multiple contentions regarding the alleged lack of jurisdiction due to improper summons, the invalidity of the special sheriff's appointment, and the mootness of the case.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court's order denying the motion to declare the writ of execution and demolition moot is appealable. Whether the motion for relief from judgment was filed within the reglementary period under Rule 38. Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of Estabillo despite the alleged unauthorized appointment of the special sheriff.

Ruling

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the lower court, dismissing Estabillo's appeal. The Court held that the order denying the motion to declare the writ of execution moot was not appealable, and the motion for relief from judgment was filed out of time and was frivolous and dilatory. The Court found no error in the denial of Estabillo's motions.

Ratio Decidendi

On Issue 1: The appeal from the order denying the motion to declare the writ of execution moot is dismissed because such an order is not appealable. The Court reaffirms the doctrine that a writ of execution or an order of demolition cannot be the subject of an appeal if it does not vary the tenor of the judgment. To allow such appeals would result in endless litigation, as every step toward execution could be delayed by a new appeal. This principle is vital for the stability of judicial decisions and the finality of litigation. Consequently, Estabillo's attempt to challenge the execution of a final judgment via this route is procedurally barred. On Issue 2: The motion for relief from judgment was filed significantly beyond the reglementary period. Under Rule 38, Section 3, a petition for relief must be filed within 60 days of learning of the judgment and within 6 months of the judgment's entry. In this case, the motion was filed nearly four years after the default judgment was rendered in December 1958. The Court found the motion to be palpably frivolous and dilatory, intended only to frustrate the execution of a final judgment. Furthermore, the affidavit of merits failed to show a meritorious defense, which is a prerequisite for relief under Rule 38. On Issue 3: The appointment of Rosauro Villamayor as special sheriff was valid under the Rules of Court. Rule 14, Section 5 specifically allows a judge to authorize any person for 'special reasons' to serve summons, and Judge Caluag's order found J.M. Tuason's petition for a special sheriff to be well-founded due to the heavy workload of the regular sheriff's office. Even if there were irregularities in the service, such as the failure of the sheriff to swear to the proof of service, these were waived by Estabillo's own actions. By filing motions to lift the default order and for relief from judgment, Estabillo made a voluntary appearance. Applying the rule in Ramos v. Mañalac and Lopez, such a voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons and submits the defendant to the jurisdiction of the court.

Main Doctrine

An order denying a motion to declare a writ of execution moot is generally not appealable, as it would lead to endless litigation. Similarly, a motion for relief from judgment filed nearly four years after the default judgment was rendered is considered belated, frivolous, and dilatory, and is thus unjustified.

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