Davide v. Roces
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Hilario Davide, a District Supervisor for fourteen years, received an ad interim appointment as City Superintendent of Schools of Lapu-Lapu City on November 6, 1961. This appointment was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on May 3, 1962. Petitioner took his oath and assumed duties, exercising control over schools in Lapu-Lapu City, superseding the Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu. Procedural History: The Director of Public Schools inquired about the absence of an appropriation for the City Superintendent of Schools in the FY 1962-1963 budget. The Office of the President, through an Assistant Executive Secretary, informed the Secretary of Education that Davide's ad interim appointment had not been released by the Office of the President and was affected by Administrative Order No. 2, which declared void all ad interim appointments extended by President Garcia after December 13, 1961. Consequently, the Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu was authorized to exercise supervision over Lapu-Lapu City schools. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus and prohibition. The Court of First Instance of Cebu ruled in favor of Davide, declaring him the de jure officer and enjoining respondents from preventing him from exercising his duties. The Petition: Respondents appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance, contending that Davide's appointment was effectively withdrawn by Administrative Order No. 2 because it was never released by the Office of the President.
Issue(s)
Whether petitioner Hilario Davide's ad interim appointment as City Superintendent of Schools of Lapu-Lapu City is valid. Whether Administrative Order No. 2, issued by President Macapagal, effectively nullified Davide's appointment.
Ruling
The appeal is dismissed, and the decision of the court a quo declaring appellee Hilario Davide as the duly appointed, confirmed, and qualified City Superintendent of Schools of Lapu-Lapu City is affirmed.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of petitioner's ad interim appointment: The Court affirmed the lower court's ruling that Davide's appointment was valid. The Court noted that the appointment was extended on November 6, 1961, and was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. While the original appointment document was not presented, a copy was admitted as evidence, and Davide testified to receiving it. The Court found that the appointment resulted from deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the position and the appointee's qualifications, as evidenced by the Director of Public Schools' letter recognizing Davide's "ability and loyalty as a public servant." On the effect of Administrative Order No. 2: The Court distinguished Davide's case from those where ad interim appointments were invalidated by Administrative Order No. 2. The Court reiterated its stance in previous cases, such as Aytona v. Castillo, that Administrative Order No. 2 did not categorically declare all appointments made by the outgoing President Garcia as void. Instead, the validity of such appointments was assessed based on their individual nature, character, merit, and surrounding circumstances. The Court emphasized that Davide's appointment was not a mass ad interim appointment issued in a single night, but rather one made after careful consideration, thus falling outside the scope of appointments proscribed by Aytona v. Castillo. The Court also highlighted the principle of protecting civil service officials against removal without lawful cause, as seen in Jorge v. Mayor.
Main Doctrine
An ad interim appointment, if made after deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the appointment and the appointee's qualifications, is not necessarily rendered void by an administrative order recalling appointments made after a certain date, especially if the appointment itself is not of doubtful character.