Cebu v. Mendoza
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Efren M. Arnejo, a former police captain of Cebu City, was designated Acting Assistant Chief of Police in 1959. His services were terminated on November 10, 1963, by the Acting City Mayor, Mario D. Ortiz, who recommended his reinstatement as police captain, a recommendation the Municipal Board did not act upon. Arnejo subsequently filed a complaint with the Civil Service Commission and later a mandamus suit against city officials, seeking reinstatement as Assistant Chief of Police, recovery of back salaries, and damages. 2. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided over by Judge Jose M. Mendoza, rendered a decision on September 10, 1965, declaring Arnejo's removal void and ordering his reinstatement with back salaries and damages. The petitioners (City of Cebu and its officials) filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on November 26, 1965. They then filed a second motion for reconsideration on December 14, 1965, which was also denied on January 5, 1966. The petitioners filed their notice of appeal on January 14, 1966, and a record on appeal and appeal bond on January 15, 1966. Respondent Arnejo moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing it was not perfected within the reglementary period. Judge Mendoza dismissed the appeal on February 18, 1966, ruling the decision was final and executory. The petitioners then filed special civil actions of mandamus and certiorari with the Supreme Court to compel the lower court to give due course to their appeal. 3. The Petition: The petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Judge to give due course to their appeal and a writ of certiorari to nullify the order dismissing their appeal. They argue that their appeal was timely perfected, contending that their motions for reconsideration interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. The core issue is whether the motions for reconsideration filed were pro forma and thus did not interrupt the appeal period, and whether the appeal was perfected within the applicable thirty-day period under the 1964 Rules of Court, considering the abolition of the fifteen-day period for mandamus cases.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioners seasonably perfected their appeal from the lower court's decision. Whether the first motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners were "pro forma" and therefore did not interrupt the appeal period. Whether the second motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners interrupted the remaining thirty-day period for perfecting the appeal. Whether appeals in mandamus and similar special proceedings must be perfected within a fifteen-day period or within the thirty-day period under section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the appeal for lack of perfection and in treating the motions as pro forma.
Ruling
The petition for mandamus and certiorari is dismissed. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners did not timely perfect their appeal because their second motions for reconsideration did not interrupt the remaining period to perfect an appeal; consequently, the trial court correctly dismissed the appeal. No costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the petitioners seasonably perfected their appeal: The Court reasoned that appeals in mandamus and similar special proceedings must be perfected within the thirty-day period fixed in section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, noting the deletion of the "but within fifteen days" phrase from the prior rule and applying Enciso v. Remo to support that construction. The petitioners could have perfected the appeal by filing a notice of appeal and depositing the appeal bond within the thirty-day period; a record on appeal was not necessary for perfection. The Court examined the dates when the order denying the first motion for reconsideration was served and calculated the last day to perfect the appeal for each respondent, concluding that the notice of appeal and bond were filed beyond those dates. The Court therefore found the appeal was not perfected in due time and relied on Reyes v. Court of Appeals to support the consequence of untimely perfection. The conclusion was that, because the appeal was not perfected within the reglementary period, the trial court's dismissal of the appeal was correct. On Whether the first motions for reconsideration were "pro forma": The Court analyzed the content of the first motions and found that, although not captioned as motions for new trial, they asserted grounds enumerated in paragraph (c), section 1, Rule 37 (excessive damages, decision contrary to law and evidence), and thus could not be characterized as mere formalities. Applying the standard from Alvero v. De la Rosa, the Court explained that a motion is pro forma only if it "does not point out specifically the findings or conclusions in the judgment, which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the pertinent evidence or legal provisions." The petitioners' motions specified particular conclusions deemed erroneous and therefore met the requirement to be more than pro forma. Consequently, the first motions did interrupt the thirty-day appeal period. On Whether the second motions for reconsideration interrupted the appeal period: The Court turned to Section 4, Rule 37, which makes a second motion for new trial permissible only if it is "based on a ground not existing nor available when the first motion was made." The Court emphasized the policy to prevent interminable repetition of motions and cited authority (Rill v. Chunaco; Vaswani v. Tarachand Bros.; Marquez v. Panganiban; Sawit v. Rodas; Rafanan v. Rafanan) that a reiteration of grounds will not toll the appeal period. The Court examined the second motions and concluded they sought reconsideration of the order denying the first motion and invoked the same grounds; therefore they were not based on new grounds and did not interrupt the remaining appeal period. Because the second motions were not sanctioned by Section 4, the petitioners could have perfected their appeal within the remaining time after the denial of the first motion. The Court held that filing a second, repetitive motion is at the litigant's peril because it may forfeit the right to appeal. On Whether appeals in mandamus must be perfected within fifteen days or thirty days: The Court observed that the fifteen-day requirement found in the 1940 Rules of Court was omitted in the 1964 Rules of Court. Citing Enciso v. Remo, the Court concluded that the deletion indicates that appeals in mandamus, certiorari, quo warranto, prohibition and employers' liability cases should be perfected within the same thirty-day period applicable to ordinary actions. The Court reasoned that the deletion was deliberate and changed the reglementary period; hence the fifteen-day rule no longer applied. This interpretation led the Court to measure petitioners' deadlines under a thirty-day rule, not fifteen days. On Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the appeal: Given the foregoing determinations — that the first motions were not pro forma and did interrupt the initial thirty-day period but the second motions did not interrupt the remaining period because they raised no new grounds — the Court affirmed the trial court's calculation of the final dates to perfect the appeal and found the respondents filed their notice of appeal and posted the bond after those dates. Applying Reyes v. Court of Appeals and related authorities, the Court concluded the trial court correctly dismissed the appeal for lack of timely perfection. The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the petition for mandamus and certiorari.
Main Doctrine
A motion for reconsideration (treated as a motion for new trial) interrupts the thirty-day period to perfect an appeal only if it is not pro forma; a second motion for new trial will interrupt the appeal period only if it is based on a ground not existing or available when the first motion was made.