Consing v. Jamandre
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Plaintiffs-petitioners filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against the defendant-respondent for taking possession of Haciendas "Aida" and "Fe." This possession was allegedly taken despite a contract of sublease executed on October 19, 1962, wherein the plaintiffs-petitioners were the sub-lessees and the father of the defendant-respondent, Cirilo Jamandre, was the sub-lessor. The defendant-respondent claimed he took over the haciendas on September 11, 1963, seven months after his father's death, due to the plaintiffs-petitioners' failure to comply with paragraphs 3 and 4 of the sublease contract, which stipulated payment of 1,000 piculs of "C" sugar and P20,000.00 annually. He justified his action based on paragraph 9 of the contract. Procedural History: The Municipal Court of Sagay ruled in favor of the plaintiffs-petitioners, ordering the defendant-respondent to vacate and restore possession. The defendant-respondent appealed to the Court of First Instance (CFI). The CFI denied the plaintiffs-petitioners' motion for summary judgment and motion to strike, and later, in its appellate jurisdiction, rendered judgment ordering the defendant-respondent to vacate the premises and deliver possession to the plaintiffs, requiring an accounting of expenses and income, and ordering the payment of costs. The defendant-respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The Petition: The Court of Appeals reversed the CFI's decision, dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant P19,000.00 on his counterclaim. The CA also ordered the defendant to account for harvested sugarcane and deliver any excess to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs-petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court. The petitioners argued that summary judgment should have been granted, that evidence in forcible entry cases should be limited to possession de facto, and that stipulation no. 9 of the contract, authorizing the respondent to take possession without court action, was illegal and violative of due process.
Issue(s)
Whether the stipulation in the contract of sub-lease authorizing the sub-lessor to take possession of the leased premises without judicial action is valid and binding. Whether the reception of evidence in a forcible entry case should be limited to possession de facto. Whether summary judgment should have been rendered by the court a quo.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. It held that the stipulation in the contract of sub-lease authorizing the sub-lessor to take possession of the leased premises without judicial action in case of the sub-lessee's failure to comply with the terms and conditions is valid and binding. The Court also ruled that the lower court did not err in going beyond possession de facto to interpret the contract and determine damages, and that summary judgment was not warranted as there were disputed questions of fact.
Ratio Decidendi
On Whether the stipulation in the contract of sub-lease authorizing the sub-lessor to take possession of the leased premises without judicial action is valid and binding: The Court ruled that the stipulation (paragraph 9) is valid and binding. It is in the nature of a resolutory condition, allowing the contract to be terminated upon the exercise of the sub-lessor's right to take possession due to the sub-lessee's failure to comply with the terms. The Court cited Article 1191 of the Civil Code, which implies the power to rescind reciprocal obligations when a party defaults. It further clarified that judicial action for rescission is not always necessary if the contract expressly provides for cancellation without court intervention, as established in previous cases like Froilan vs. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. and De la Rama Steamship Co. vs. Tan. The stipulation was not found to be illegal or offensive to public policy as it did not provide for the use of force. On Whether the reception of evidence in a forcible entry case should be limited to possession de facto: The Court held that the lower court did not err in going beyond possession de facto to interpret the contract. While the primary issue in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases is physical possession (de facto), courts may receive evidence on title or possession de jure for the purpose of determining the nature and extent of possession and damages. This is in accordance with Section 88 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, which allows courts to pass upon title or ownership in ejectment cases to resolve the issue of possession and damages. On Whether summary judgment should have been rendered by the court a quo: The Court ruled that summary judgment was not a matter of right in this case. Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuine issues of fact or when the material allegations of the pleadings are not disputed. In this case, the defendant-respondent disputed the plaintiffs-petitioners' compliance with the contract terms and asserted his right to take over possession based on the contract. These disputed facts necessitated a trial on the merits, making summary judgment inappropriate.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of a stipulation in a contract of sub-lease that allowed the sub-lessor to take possession of the leased premises without judicial action in case of the sub-lessee's failure to comply with the contract terms. Citing Article 1191 of the Civil Code and established jurisprudence, the Court held that such a stipulation is not illegal as it is in the nature of a resolutory condition, and judicial intervention is not necessary when the contract expressly grants the power of cancellation. The Court also clarified that in forcible entry cases, evidence beyond mere physical possession (de facto) may be received to determine the nature of possession and damages.