City of Ozamiz v. Lumapas
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Respondent Serapio S. Lumapas, an operator of passenger and cargo buses under the name Romar Line, operated between Ozamiz City and Pagadian. The Municipal Board of Ozamiz City enacted Ordinance No. 466, series of 1964, imposing parking fees for motor vehicles parked in designated areas within the city. The ordinance defined 'parking' as the stoppage of a motor vehicle for the purpose of loading or unloading passengers or cargoes. Respondent Lumapas paid parking fees of P1.00 per bus from October 1964 to January 1967, totaling P1,259.00, under protest. Procedural History: Respondent Lumapas filed a complaint against the City of Ozamiz, seeking to nullify Ordinance No. 466 and recover the P1,259.00 paid as parking fees, plus attorney's fees. The City of Ozamiz argued that the ordinance was valid. A Stipulation of Facts was submitted, acknowledging that the parking area was part of the city's market site, which was for public use, and that Zulueta Street had been extended through it. The trial court, after an ocular inspection, declared Ordinance No. 466 null and void, finding the parking fee to be in the nature of toll fees for the use of a public road, in violation of Section 59(b) of Republic Act No. 4136 (Land Transportation and Traffic Code) due to the lack of prior presidential approval. The court ordered the reimbursement of the collected fees. The Petition: The City of Ozamiz appealed the decision, contending that the lower court erred in declaring the ordinance void, in classifying the parking fees as road tolls, in considering the parking area as a public street instead of patrimonial property, and in ordering the reimbursement of the fees.
Issue(s)
Whether Ordinance No. 466, series of 1964, of Ozamiz City is null and void. Whether the parking fees imposed by the ordinance are in the nature of road tolls under Section 59(b) of Republic Act No. 4136. Whether the parking area is a public street or the patrimonial property of the city. Whether the City of Ozamiz had the power to enact Ordinance No. 466.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court, declared Ordinance No. 466, series of 1964, valid, and ordered that no pronouncement as to costs be made.
Ratio Decidendi
On the validity of Ordinance No. 466 and the City's power to enact it: The Court held that municipal corporations possess only such powers as are expressly granted or necessarily implied. The power to tax is inherent in the State and can only be exercised by municipal corporations when delegated by Congress. Section 15(y) of the Ozamiz City Charter (Republic Act No. 321) expressly grants the Municipal Board the power to regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks, and other public places. This delegation of police power allows the city to make reasonable regulations for public safety and convenience. The Court found that the ordinance was enacted in pursuance of this grant of authority, as it aimed to regulate the time, place, and manner of parking to promote public health, safety, and welfare. The minimal fees indicated a regulatory purpose rather than revenue generation, and the designation of specific loading/unloading areas provided benefits like increased safety and convenience by decongesting traffic. On whether parking fees are road tolls under Section 59(b) of Republic Act No. 4136: The Court distinguished between 'parking' and 'toll fees.' While Section 59(b) of Republic Act No. 4136 prohibits the imposition of toll fees for the use of public roads without presidential approval, the ordinance in question imposed 'parking fees.' The Court noted that the ordinance defined 'parking' as the stoppage of a motor vehicle for loading or unloading passengers or cargoes in designated parking areas. The fees were only collected when vehicles stopped for this purpose, not for mere passage through the street. Therefore, the fees were considered parking fees for the privilege of using the designated area, not toll fees for traveling along the road. The Court emphasized that the Land Transportation and Traffic Code defines 'parking' as remaining inactive in a place for an appreciable period, distinguishing it from a temporary stop for loading/unloading with dispatch. Since the fees were for stopping in designated areas for loading/unloading, they were not toll fees subject to the presidential approval requirement. On whether the parking area is a public street or patrimonial property: The Court acknowledged that the area was part of the city's market site, which was for public use. However, it also noted that Zulueta Street had been extended through this area. Regardless of whether the specific spot was classified as a public street or patrimonial property, the Court found that the city possessed the power to regulate its use under its charter. The power to regulate streets and public places, granted by Section 15(y) of the Charter, encompassed the authority to designate parking areas and impose reasonable fees for their use. The fact that the area might have been considered patrimonial property did not preclude the city from regulating its use for public convenience and safety, especially when it involved traffic management. On the reimbursement of parking fees: Since the Court found Ordinance No. 466 to be valid and the imposition of parking fees to be a legitimate exercise of the city's regulatory power, the lower court's order for reimbursement was reversed. The fees collected were deemed lawful, and respondent Lumapas was not entitled to recover them. The Court reiterated that the fees were for the privilege of using designated parking spaces and were intended for regulation, supervision, inspection, and control to ensure traffic flow and public safety, not as an illegal exaction.
Main Doctrine
A municipal ordinance imposing parking fees for the use of designated parking areas, even if located on a street, is a valid exercise of police power for regulation and not an invalid imposition of toll fees, provided it is enacted pursuant to the municipality's power to regulate its streets and public places, and the fees are reasonable and intended for supervision, inspection, and control, rather than solely for revenue. Such an ordinance does not require presidential approval under Section 59(b) of Republic Act No. 4136 if it is classified as a parking fee and not a toll fee.