Banzon v. Cabato
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: An Information for estafa was filed against petitioner Aurelio Banzon for allegedly offering to sell a parcel of land covered by a Townsite Sales Application (TSA) V-5017 to Ramona Villaruz for P4,000.00, when the property did not belong to him but to the Heirs of Pool, to the damage and prejudice of Villaruz. Procedural History: The case was initially filed with Branch I of the City Court of Baguio (Criminal Case No. 20237). Upon verbal motion to quash by the accused's counsel for lack of preliminary investigation, the case was dismissed without prejudice by Judge Patricio C. Perez. Subsequently, Villaruz refiled the case, and the City Fiscal's Office conducted a preliminary investigation, recommending dismissal for lack of probable cause, citing that the facts did not fall within Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The resolution noted that the incident arose from the sale of rights and interests over the TSA, and the vendee's inability to pursue the application due to its cancellation did not give rise to criminal responsibility, though a civil recourse might be available. Villaruz moved for reconsideration, but later withdrew it. About a year later, Villaruz refiled the same criminal complaint with Branch III of the City Court of Baguio (Criminal Case No. 22610), presided over by respondent Judge Federico L. Cabato. Judge Cabato issued a notice of hearing for a preliminary examination and investigation, stating that no previous preliminary examination and investigation was conducted by the Fiscal. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the case was already dismissed by the Fiscal for lack of probable cause and that the Judge's statement was contrary to fact, violating Section 13 of Rule 112. Respondent Villaruz opposed the motion, stating the fiscal's resolution was not final. Judge Cabato issued an order holding the resolution on the motion to dismiss in abeyance and resetting the investigation. On December 6, 1969, the Judge issued an order denying the motion to dismiss and resetting the preliminary investigation. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul the Order of December 6, 1969, and to enjoin the respondent Judge from proceeding with the case for want of jurisdiction. Petitioner argued that the respondent Judge had no authority to conduct a preliminary investigation after the case was dismissed by the City Fiscal for lack of probable cause.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent City Judge has the authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a criminal case that falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the Court of First Instance, after the same case was dismissed by the City Fiscal for lack of probable cause. Whether the accused in an offense falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city courts and courts of first instance is entitled to a preliminary investigation.
Ruling
The questioned Order of December 6, 1969, is set aside, and the temporary restraining order issued on January 19, 1970, is made permanent, with costs against respondent Ramona Villaruz.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the respondent City Judge's authority to conduct a preliminary investigation: The Court held that the respondent Judge is without authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 22610. The offense charged, estafa involving P4,000.00, falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the City Court and the Court of First Instance. The Court reiterated the settled dogma that the right to a preliminary investigation is statutory and can only be invoked when specifically granted by statute. In promulgating the Revised Rules of Court, the intention was to withhold the right of preliminary investigation from the accused in cases triable by municipal and city courts, as the ensuing trial on the merits would take the place of such investigation, ensuring a speedy and expeditious trial. The lower court's construction, which would qualify Section 14 of the Rule to mean that no information for an offense cognizable concurrently by the Court of First Instance and inferior courts shall be filed without a preliminary investigation, was deemed untenable. The rule plainly provides that there shall be no right of preliminary investigation in cases triable by inferior courts, without distinction as to whether such cases be of their exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction. On whether the accused is entitled to a preliminary investigation in cases of concurrent jurisdiction: The Court affirmed that the accused in an offense falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city courts and courts of first instance is not entitled to a preliminary investigation as a matter of right. This interpretation aligns with the intention behind the Revised Rules of Court, which aimed to prevent the loss of time and protracted litigations associated with preliminary investigations in cases triable by inferior courts. The rationale is that the trial on the merits, which is assured to be speedy and expeditious, serves as a sufficient safeguard, replacing the preliminary investigation. The Court emphasized that the dismissal of a charge by a fiscal in a preliminary investigation does not constitute jeopardy, unlike a judgment on the merits.
Main Doctrine
A respondent judge is without authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a criminal case falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and the court of first instance, especially after the case has been dismissed by the fiscal for lack of probable cause.