Taroma v. Sayo
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Rufino Taroma and Cayetana Gasidan initiated an action in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte to quiet title to land and recover possession thereof, along with damages, against respondent Inocencio Crisostomo. The underlying dispute concerned the ownership and possession of a parcel of land. Procedural History: The case proceeded to a pre-trial conference. However, for the failure of respondent Inocencio Crisostomo and his counsel to appear at the scheduled pre-trial on March 2, 1971, the lower court, then presided by Judge Jose A. Madarang, declared the respondent in default. The petitioners then presented their evidence ex-parte, leading to a decision in their favor on March 13, 1972. Subsequently, on April 12, 1972, respondent Crisostomo, through new counsel, filed a motion to set aside the default order and the decision, asserting a denial of due process due to lack of notice of the pre-trial. The respondent judge, Marcelino N. Sayo, granted this motion, setting aside the default and ex-parte decision and resetting the case for a new pre-trial, which was later challenged by the petitioners. The Petition: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court, seeking to annul the respondent judge's order that set aside the default and ex-parte decision. The core issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether notice of a pre-trial conference must be served separately on both the party-litigant and their counsel of record. The petitioners argued that notice to counsel should suffice, while the respondent judge's order was based on the premise that the respondent party himself had not been duly notified. The Supreme Court, in resolving this petition, reaffirmed its recent rulings that separate notice to both the party and their counsel is mandatory for pre-trial conferences.
Issue(s)
Whether notice of pre-trial must be served separately upon the party and his counsel of record. Whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the default order and ex-parte decision.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The restraining order issued against the challenged order resetting the case anew for pre-trial and eventual trial and disposition on the merits is lifted. The judge presiding the respondent court is directed to conduct an investigation into the alleged misrepresentation by the respondent's former counsel regarding the receipt of the pre-trial notice.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of whether notice of pre-trial must be served separately upon the party and his counsel of record: The Court reaffirmed its recent rulings that notice of pre-trial must be served separately upon the party affected thereby and his counsel of record. This is based on Rule 20, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which makes pre-trial mandatory and requires the court to direct both parties and their attorneys to appear. Section 2 of the same rule states that a party who fails to appear may be non-suited or considered in default. The general rule of notice to counsel constituting notice to parties under Rule 13, Section 2, has been held insufficient for pre-trial purposes due to the severe consequences of non-appearance. The Court emphasized the importance of pre-trial and the adverse effects of a party's failure to appear, necessitating proof that both the party and his counsel were duly served with notice. The Court further restated for the guidance of the bench and bar that while service of notice to the party may be made directly, it is best that trial courts uniformly serve such notice through or care of the party's counsel at counsel's address. This imposes upon counsel the obligation to notify the party and assure their appearance or provide written authority to compromise, with the warning that failure to do so may result in non-suit or default. The notice should be addressed to both counsel and the party, care of the counsel, explicitly stating counsel's obligation and the consequences of non-compliance. On the issue of whether the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the default order and ex-parte decision: The respondent judge properly set aside the default order and ex-parte decision because the respondent had not been served with notice of the pre-trial, either directly or through his then counsel. The Court reiterated that before a party can be non-suited or considered in default, it must be shown that both the party and his counsel were duly served with notice of the pre-trial conference. Since the respondent was not duly notified, he was denied his day in court, and the judge acted correctly in setting aside the default order and decision to give both parties a fair chance to litigate their case. The Court noted, however, that there appeared to be certifications from the clerk and postmaster contradicting the former counsel's disclaimer of receipt of the pre-trial notice, and directed an investigation into this potential misrepresentation.
Main Doctrine
Notice of pre-trial must be served separately upon the party and his counsel of record. Service to the party may be made directly to him or through his counsel, who shall be required to serve the notice upon the party, with the express imposition upon counsel of the obligation of notifying the party and assuring their appearance or providing written authority to compromise, under penalty of non-suit or default.