Pineda v. Court of Appeals
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Private respondents filed a civil case for damages against petitioners following a vehicular accident. The trial court declared petitioners in default due to their failure to appear at pre-trial and subsequently rendered a decision ordering them to pay P92,000.00 in damages. 2. Procedural History: Petitioners' motion for new trial was initially granted by the trial court. However, this order was elevated to the Court of Appeals via certiorari by the private respondents and was subsequently set aside by the appellate court. Following this reversal, petitioners filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal to challenge the original decision. The trial court disallowed this appeal, deeming it filed out of time. 3. The Petition: Petitioners seek a writ of certiorari to overturn the Court of Appeals' decision that dismissed their petition for mandamus. They argue that the appellate court erred in disallowing their appeal, contending that the period to appeal should only commence after the finality of the Court of Appeals' decision that reversed the grant of a new trial, not from the date they received that decision. They assert that their appeal was timely filed within the remaining period after the appellate court's decision became final.
Issue(s)
Whether the remaining period to appeal a trial court's judgment, which was previously vacated by a grant of new trial, resumes immediately upon receipt of an appellate decision reversing said grant, or only upon the finality of that appellate decision.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside, and the trial court is ordered to set aside its order dismissing the appeal and give due course to it, if all other requisites are in order.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: Applying Rule 37, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court held that the grant of a new trial vacates the original judgment, meaning the judgment ceases to exist as a matter of law. When an appellate court reverses such a grant, the original judgment is not merely 'resumed' but is 'repromulgated' or given new life. Following the doctrine in Lucas v. Mariano (44 SCRA 501), the Court clarified that an order which reinstates a previously vacated dismissal or judgment must be considered a newly appealable event. Therefore, the period to appeal the revived judgment must be computed from the date of finality of the decision that effected the revival. To hold otherwise would create an 'incongruous situation' where a party's right to move for reconsideration or seek review of the appellate decision would be rendered moot if the lower court judgment became final in the interim. Since the petitioners received the CA decision on September 17, 1973, it became final 15 days later on October 2, 1973, and the remaining 3-day appeal period only commenced on October 3, 1973. Consequently, the filing of the appeal on October 1, 1973, was not only timely but was actually done before the revived judgment had even become appealable again.
Main Doctrine
The period for appeal is suspended by a motion for new trial and resumes running from the date the movant receives the appellate court's decision reversing the grant of new trial, and the appeal must be perfected within the remaining period, considering the finality of the appellate court's decision.