Isada v. Bocar
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority (NWSA), pursuant to its collective bargaining agreement with employee unions, set aside 58 hectares of land for a housing project. A raffle was conducted to select 1,411 awardees from its employees and workers. The NWSA Board subsequently approved resolutions to sell raw land to the unions at P4.00 per square meter, with individual awardees to purchase lots at P5.50 per square meter. The arrangement involved individual employee loans from the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) to finance the purchase, with the GSIS deducting payments to NWSA from the loan proceeds. An interim loan of P1.5 million was secured from the GSIS to pay the contractor, Builders Heavy Equipment and Service Corporation (BHESCO), which had already begun site development. Procedural History: Petitioner Sergio M. Isada, Acting General Manager of NWSA, began executing deeds of sale with mortgage in favor of individual awardees. However, he later refused to sign the remaining deeds. This led the awardees, through their attorney-in-fact and housing committee, to file a petition for mandamus with the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking to compel Isada to execute the deeds. The respondent court granted a mandatory preliminary injunction, ordering Isada to execute the deeds of sale. Isada then filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court, seeking to set aside the lower court's orders. The Petition: Petitioner Sergio M. Isada, in his capacity as Acting General Manager of NWSA and personally, seeks certiorari and prohibition to annul the orders of the Court of First Instance of Manila granting a mandatory preliminary injunction. The injunction compelled him to execute deeds of sale for housing lots to over 700 NWSA employees. Isada argues that Resolution No. 283-'69 merely authorized him to sign the deeds, not mandated him to do so, and that he has discretion in the matter. He also raised concerns about potential victimization of employees and the prejudgment of the case by the preliminary injunction. The petition asks the Supreme Court to set aside the lower court's orders and to issue its own preliminary injunction.
Issue(s)
Whether the petition for mandamus was the proper remedy to compel the petitioner to sign the deeds of sale. Whether the petitioner, as Acting General Manager, had discretion to refuse signing the deeds of sale. Whether the preliminary mandatory injunction issued by the respondent court was proper.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The orders of the respondent court granting the mandatory preliminary injunction are affirmed. The petitioner is directed to sign the deeds of sale and complete the requirements for the subdivision plan's approval.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of mandamus and the petitioner's duty to sign the deeds of sale: The Court held that the mandamus sought was not for the specific performance of a contract but to compel a corporate officer to perform a duty imposed upon him by law and by a resolution of the Board of Directors. The NWSA Board, through Resolution No. 283-'69, authorized the petitioner to sign the deeds of sale, and this authorization did not grant him discretion to refuse. The Court found that there was a perfected and partially consummated contract of sale between NWSA and the awardees, as evidenced by the down payments made. Petitioner's refusal to sign the deeds was deemed an arbitrary failure to comply with his official duty, obstructing the implementation of a laudable project. The Court cited Section 7 of Republic Act 1383, which outlines the Manager's duties, including representing the Authority in business matters and performing executive duties prescribed by law or board resolution. The Court emphasized that the duty to sign the deeds, when properly prepared in conformity with agreed conditions, was ministerial, analogous to an auditor signing a warrant for a valid obligation. The Court reiterated that mandamus would lie to compel an officer to perform such ministerial duties, citing previous cases where mandamus compelled auditors to sign warrants for undisputed obligations. On the petitioner's contention of discretion and the nature of the contract: The petitioner's contention that Resolution No. 283-'69 merely "authorized" him to sign and did not impose a duty was rejected. The Court found no discretion granted to the petitioner to set aside the Board's action. The arrangement was clearly laid out: employees would secure GSIS loans, NWSA would execute deeds of sale to enable mortgaging, and GSIS would remit loan proceeds to NWSA to cover the lot purchase price. The Court noted that the contract was not only perfected but partially consummated, with awardees having paid down payments. The legality of the contract was not in dispute, and NWSA was not reneging on its obligations. The Court found that the petitioner's refusal was arbitrary and impeded the completion of the project, affecting not only the contract between NWSA and the awardees but also the contracts with the contractor (BHESCO) and the GSIS. On the propriety of the preliminary mandatory injunction: The Court found that the preliminary mandatory injunction was justified because the issues on the merits of the mandamus petition had already been substantially threshed out during the hearing for the injunction. The Court observed that there was hardly anything left to be litigated, and a trial on the principal petition would serve no useful purpose, merely delaying the project. The Court highlighted that the GSIS had already committed to finance the project and had granted an interim loan, demonstrating the irrevocability of the commitment. The Court also dismissed the petitioner's suggestion that employees might be victimized, finding it speculative and noting that the employees themselves were seeking relief through the courts. The Court concluded that mandamus was the appropriate remedy to compel the performance of the petitioner's ministerial duty.
Main Doctrine
Mandamus lies to compel a corporate officer to perform a ministerial duty imposed by law or resolution, even if it involves executing deeds of sale pursuant to a contract, especially when the corporation itself is not reneging on its obligations and the private party has partially consummated the contract.