Racimo v. Diño
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Ciriaco Racimo, a lessee of a lot from Manila Railroad Company since 1945, subleased it to Arcadio Diño. On May 27, 1958, Racimo filed an unlawful detainer action against Diño in the justice of the peace court. Diño raised defenses of lack of cause of action and jurisdiction, asserting only the Manila Railroad Company could eject him and that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction due to his long occupancy. Procedural History: The justice of the peace court, on October 25, 1962, ordered Diño to vacate and pay damages. Diño appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. After docketing and refiling of pleadings, the lower court, on March 31, 1964, ex mero motu dismissed Diño's appeal for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time and ordered its remand for execution. Diño's motion for reconsideration was denied. Diño appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising questions of law and fact. The Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court, finding it involved a pure question of law. The Petition: Diño contended that Section 9, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court did not authorize the trial court to dismiss an appeal motu proprio for failure to prosecute without a motion to dismiss, arguing it violated due process and that the Clerk of Court had a mandatory duty to set the case for pre-trial.
Issue(s)
Whether the lower court erred in dismissing the appeal ex mero motu for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. Whether Section 9, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court requires a motion to dismiss before an appeal can be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal, holding that the trial court did not err in dismissing Diño's appeal. The Court ruled that the power of the trial court to dismiss an action or appeal for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time rests in its sound discretion and can be exercised motu proprio.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of the lower court's authority to dismiss the appeal ex mero motu for failure to prosecute: The Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Diño's appeal. The Court clarified that under Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, an action can be dismissed by the trial court on its own motion for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time. This power is vested in the sound discretion of the trial court, and what constitutes an unreasonable length of time depends on the circumstances of each case. The onus is on the appellant to show an abuse of this discretion, and the presumption is in favor of the correctness of the lower court's action. The Court cited Monte vs. Urotia and other cases to support this principle. The fact that Racimo's lawyer filed a motion to withdraw did not justify Diño's failure to prosecute his appeal for nine months, as this was Racimo's concern, not Diño's responsibility. The Court emphasized that ejectment cases are summary actions that should be disposed of with the least delay, and this case had been pending for nearly six years. On the issue of whether Section 9, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court requires a motion to dismiss: The Supreme Court held that the ruling under Section 3 of Rule 17, which allows dismissal on the court's own motion, is applicable to an appeal to the Court of First Instance from the decision of an inferior court under Section 9 of Rule 40. The Court cited People's Car Inc. vs. Arcellana and Bolivar vs. Bandayrel as precedents where appeals were dismissed for failure to prosecute. The Court further stated that while it is the duty of the Clerk of Court to calendar cases for pre-trial or trial, this obligation does not relieve the appellant from diligently prosecuting their appeal. The Court noted that it had refused to disturb dismissals for failure to prosecute for periods shorter than the nine months in this case. Therefore, Diño's contention that a motion to dismiss was mandatory and that the dismissal violated due process was found to be untenable.
Main Doctrine
The trial court did not err in dismissing an appeal from an inferior court for failure to prosecute for an unreasonable length of time, even without a motion to dismiss, as the power to dismiss rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and is applicable under Section 9, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.