Cabral v. Puno
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On the complaint of Silvino San Diego, the Provincial Fiscal filed an Information accusing petitioner Eugenio Cabral of Falsification of Public Document for allegedly falsifying San Diego's signature on a deed of sale of a parcel of land on August 14, 1948. The deed was notarized on the same date, registered on August 26, 1948, and a new title was issued. Petitioner had since then publicly and continuously possessed the property. Procedural History: Petitioner moved to quash the Information on the ground of prescription, which was granted by Judge Juan F. Echiverri on March 25, 1975, finding the factual averments supporting prescription to be admitted. The private prosecutor, not present during the hearing, moved for reconsideration. Petitioner opposed, citing San Diego's filing of a civil action in April 1974 based on the same allegations. Respondent Judge Benigno M. Puno, after the Fiscal commented that the crime had not prescribed as San Diego discovered it in October 1970, set aside the dismissal order and revived the Information on May 21, 1975. The Petition: Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing the order of acquittal became final and that San Diego lost his right to intervene by filing a civil case. These motions were denied, leading to the present petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the order reviving the Information and prohibit further proceedings.
Issue(s)
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to set aside its Resolution dated March 25, 1975, which dismissed the Information on the ground of prescription. Whether the offended party, Silvino San Diego, had the legal personality to move for reconsideration or appeal an order of dismissal when the Fiscal did not.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The Orders of May 21, 1975, August 4, 1975, and September 3, 1975, of the respondent Judge are set aside.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of jurisdiction to set aside the dismissal order: The Court held that the Resolution of March 25, 1975, dismissing the Information on the ground of prescription, had become final and executory. The Fiscal, who received a copy on March 31, 1975, neither sought reconsideration nor appealed within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. Consequently, the revival of the Information on May 21, 1975, approximately two months after the dismissal order became final, was an act performed without jurisdiction. The Rules of Court explicitly state that an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, and Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code lists prescription of the crime as a ground for the total extinction of criminal liability. The crime of falsification, carrying a penalty of prision correccional, prescribes in ten (10) years, and the facts indicated San Diego had notice of the alleged forgery as early as August 26, 1948. On the legal personality of the offended party to intervene: The Court affirmed that the prosecution of a criminal case is under the direction and control of the Fiscal. While the offended party, through the private prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration within the fifteen-day period, this did not stop the running of the period for appeal, as the offended party lacked the legal personality to file such a motion or appeal on his own behalf. Only a motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have interrupted the period. Furthermore, the offended party lost his right to intervene in the criminal case by filing a civil action (Civil Case No. 120-V-74) on May 2, 1974, based on the same allegations of forgery, prior to the filing of the criminal case. This pending civil action arising from the same alleged forged document meant the offended party had no right to intervene in the criminal prosecution or seek reconsideration of its dismissal.
Main Doctrine
An order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription of the crime is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense and becomes final and executory if not timely reconsidered or appealed by the Fiscal, rendering subsequent revival of the information void for want of jurisdiction. The offended party cannot unilaterally revive a dismissed criminal case or appeal an order of dismissal if the Fiscal does not act, especially when a civil action arising from the same offense is pending.