Cruz v. Gatan
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Serafin G. Cruz was arrested by Philippine Constabulary (PC) agents on August 30, 1976, and detained at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga, under the command of respondent Gen. Romeo Gatan. The arrest and detention were justified by the respondent as being legally ordered by the President under martial law powers, specifically citing Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order No. 4122 for alleged violation of Article 147 of the Revised Penal Code (Illegal Associations), with Cruz identified as the "Over-all Commander and Contractor General of the Bataan Defenders Command." 2. Procedural History: Following his arrest and detention, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed on behalf of Serafin G. Cruz. The respondent, Gen. Romeo Gatan, admitted the arrest and detention, justifying it under martial law powers and a specific Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order. Subsequently, counsel for the petitioner commented on the return, noting that Cruz preferred to remain in protective custody even after the arrest of a key associate, Atty. Cecilio Baylon Buenafe. At a subsequent hearing, Cruz reiterated his preference for protective custody. 3. The Petition: The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed on October 22, 1976, asserting that Serafin G. Cruz was held incommunicado, restrained of liberty without due process, and detained without a court order. It was argued that Cruz was not covered by Proclamation No. 1081 and that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus had not been suspended for his case. However, the subsequent preference of the petitioner to remain under protective custody rendered the issues raised in the petition moot and unnecessary, leading to the dismissal of the case.
Issue(s)
Whether the arrest and detention of Serafin G. Cruz were legal under the circumstances. Whether the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was suspended in relation to the petitioner.
Ruling
The petition for habeas corpus is DISMISSED. No costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the legality of the arrest and detention: The respondent justified the arrest and detention of Serafin G. Cruz by virtue of Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order No. 4122, dated August 28, 1976, issued by the Secretary of National Defense, for violation of Article 147 of the Revised Penal Code (Illegal Associations). The petitioner was identified as the "Over-all Commander and Contractor General of the Bataan Defenders Command," an unregistered veterans outfit. The respondent further claimed that the petitioner's continued detention was voluntary, stemming from fears of harm from members of the "Bataan Defenders Command" if released before the arrest of the mastermind and legal counsel. Subsequently, the petitioner's counsel filed a comment stating that Serafin G. Cruz preferred to stay within Camp Olivas, even after the arrest of Atty. Cecilio Baylon Buenafe. At the hearing, Serafin G. Cruz manifested his preference for protective custody. On the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus: The Court noted that under General Order No. 2-A, as amended, the President, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, ordered the Secretary of National Defense to arrest and take into custody persons committing crimes in furtherance of or in connection with rebellion, insurrection, or other crimes against public order, including violations of Article 147 of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to an Arrest, Search, and Seizure Order for violation of Article 147, making his arrest and continued detention legal. The Court also referenced the case of Aquino, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile etc., et al., which settled the declaration of martial law and the consequent suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus with respect to persons reasonably believed or charged to be engaged in disorder or fomenting it. Therefore, any inquiry into the continued detention of the petitioner would be purposeless.
Main Doctrine
The petition for habeas corpus was dismissed because the petitioner's arrest and detention were found to be legal under the powers exercised during martial law, and the petitioner himself expressed a preference for protective custody.