Torreda v. Boncaros
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: This case concerns the death of Pascasio Torreda, who was a passenger on a cargo truck. The truck he was on was struck by lumber protruding from another cargo truck driven by Serapion Tionson, an employee of Visayan Sawmill, Inc. and Ang Tay. The protruding lumber fatally impaled Mr. Torreda. The petitioner, Illuminada T. Torreda, is the widow of the deceased and alleges that the death was caused by the negligence of Tionson and his employers in the loading and driving of their truck. She claims significant financial losses and damages due to her husband's death, who was the proprietor of a profitable fishing business. 2. Procedural History: A criminal complaint for homicide through reckless imprudence was filed in 1968. The driver, Serapion Tionson, escaped the jurisdiction of the court and has not been apprehended. The criminal case remained untried for over nine years. On August 19, 1972, the petitioner filed a notice reserving her right to file a separate civil action. Subsequently, on December 15, 1972, she filed a civil action for damages (Civil Case No. 5541) against Visayan Sawmill, Inc., Ang Tay, and Serapion Tionson. The respondents filed a motion to dismiss, arguing lack of cause of action. They later filed a supplemental motion to dismiss, asserting that the civil action based on quasi-delict had prescribed. The respondent court, on January 17, 1974, dismissed the case, ruling that the action had prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code. A motion for reconsideration was denied on November 20, 1974, with the court citing Corpus vs. Paje and Capuno vs. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., and stating that the filing of the criminal case did not suspend the prescriptive period for a quasi-delict action. 3. The Petition: The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the dismissal orders of the respondent court and to reinstate Civil Case No. 5541 for trial on the merits. The core of the petition argues that the respondent court erred in dismissing the civil action on the ground of prescription. While acknowledging that a quasi-delict action is separate from a criminal action, the petitioner contends that the defense of prescription was raised belatedly in a supplemental motion, and under Rule 9, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, such defenses, if not pleaded in a motion to dismiss or answer, are deemed waived. The petitioner asserts that applying this rule, particularly given the peculiar circumstances and the potential lack of remedy, would serve the ends of justice, especially since no reason was provided for the delayed assertion of prescription.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent court erred in dismissing the civil action on the ground of prescription. Whether the defense of prescription was deemed waived by the respondents for being raised belatedly in a supplemental motion to dismiss.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The orders of the respondent court dismissing the civil case are set aside, and the case is ordered to be reinstated for trial on the merits.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription and waiver of defense: The Court acknowledged that from a technical viewpoint, the action based on culpa aquiliana might appear to have prescribed. However, it noted that the defense of prescription was not raised in the original motion to dismiss filed on February 16, 1973, but only in a supplemental motion filed on September 8, 1973. Under Section 2 of Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. The Court found that in the peculiar circumstances of this case, where the petitioner would be left without a remedy if the respondents were excused for belatedly invoking prescription, equity and substantial justice made it preferable to apply the general rule. The respondents provided no reason for the delayed invocation of prescription, which was evident even before the original motion to dismiss was filed. Therefore, the defense of prescription was deemed waived. On the availability of a separate civil action for quasi-delict: The Court reiterated that an action for quasi-delict under Articles 2176-2177 of the Civil Code is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from the offense charged in a criminal case. While the respondent court correctly pointed out that reckless imprudence is not one of the cases covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code, allowing for an independent civil action, the offended party is not left without a remedy. She can file an action for quasi-delict, which is subject to the prescriptive period provided in Article 1146 of the Civil Code. The filing of the criminal case and the reservation to file a separate civil action do not suspend the prescriptive period for a quasi-delict action, as it is independent of the criminal proceedings.
Main Doctrine
A defense of prescription, if not raised in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, is deemed waived, especially when equity and substantial justice would be better served by applying the general rule, and no reason is given for the belated invocation of the defense.