David v. Ejercito
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the unlawful occupation of Lot No. 285-B in Angeles City. Private respondents, spouses Horacio A. and Gloria S. Gomez, filed an ejectment case against petitioner Luciano M. David for his failure to vacate the premises. Petitioner was declared in default, and a decision was rendered ordering him to vacate, pay rentals, and attorney's fees. 2. Procedural History: Following the default judgment and subsequent writ of execution, petitioner failed to comply. Motions for demolition of his residential house on the lot were issued by the City Court of Angeles City. Despite multiple attempts to enforce these orders, including an alias writ of execution, petitioner consistently refused to vacate. Petitioner's attempts to recall the demolition orders were denied by the City Court. He then appealed these denials to the Court of First Instance, which dismissed his appeal, citing Supreme Court rulings that a party declared in default cannot appeal. 3. The Petition: Petitioner seeks review on certiorari of the Court of First Instance's order dismissing his appeal. He argues that the lower court erred in not allowing his appeal from the orders denying his motion to recall the demolition order and the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Petitioner also contends that the alias writ of execution and demolition order were void as they were issued beyond the five-year period for execution by motion. The Supreme Court, however, found no merit in these contentions, noting that petitioner's own actions caused the delay and that he was estopped from questioning the demolition order due to a written agreement he executed.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Court erred in dismissing the petitioner's appeal from the City Court's order denying his motion to recall the order of demolition and the subsequent denial of his motion for reconsideration. Whether the alias writ of execution and the order of demolition were null and void for having been issued after the five-year limitation for revival of judgment by motion.
Ruling
The petition is dismissed. The judgment of the City Court is immediately executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On the appealability of the order denying the motion to recall the order of demolition: The Supreme Court held that an order of execution is generally not appealable, as this would lead to endless litigation. Consequently, an order of demolition issued in pursuance of a writ of execution is also not appealable. The Court affirmed that the respondent Court of First Instance was correct in dismissing the petitioner's appeal. The proper recourse for assailing such orders, if valid grounds existed, would have been a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition, alleging lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. On the validity of the alias writ of execution and order of demolition beyond the five-year limitation: The Court found the petitioner's contention untenable. The record showed that the petitioner himself caused the delay in the execution of the judgment for almost eight years from its finality. Despite the private respondents' motions for execution and demolition, the petitioner consistently refused to comply or actively sought to delay the proceedings. The Court noted that petitioner even entered into a written agreement acknowledging the right to demolish and securing a final 30-day grace period, making him estopped from questioning the demolition order. Nevertheless, even prescinding from estoppel, the Court, in the interest of equity, treated the motions for execution and demolition, filed beyond the five-year period, as constituting an action to revive the judgment under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The parties were fully heard, and the delay was solely attributable to the petitioner, making it an idle ceremony to insist on a separate action for revival.
Main Doctrine
An order of execution or demolition issued pursuant to a judgment is generally not appealable, as such appeals would indefinitely prolong litigation. However, where the delay in execution is attributable to the party against whom the judgment is rendered, the court may, in the interest of equity, treat subsequent motions for execution or demolition as an action to revive the judgment, even if beyond the five-year period, provided the parties were given full opportunity to be heard.