Carreon v. Buissan
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the 1971 mayoralty election in Dapitan City, where Germanico A. Carreon was the protestee and Paterno F. Adasa was the protestant. The Court of First Instance initially declared Adasa as the duly elected Mayor. 2. Procedural History: Carreon appealed the Court of First Instance decision to the Court of Appeals. Despite the appeal, the respondent judge issued a writ of execution, ousting Carreon and installing Adasa. Carreon then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the execution orders and reinstated Carreon. Adasa's subsequent certiorari petition to the Supreme Court was denied. The Court of Appeals' judgment in this matter became final. The record was remanded for execution. However, Carreon's motion to execute the judgment for attorney's fees and costs awarded by the Court of Appeals was denied by the respondent judge, who deemed it premature as it was considered an incident to the main election protest, which was still pending. The Court of Appeals later reversed the initial decision in the election protest, dismissing Adasa's claim. Adasa's appeal of this reversal to the Supreme Court was also denied. 3. The Petition: This petition for certiorari and mandamus seeks to compel the respondent judge to execute the final judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. SP-01824-R, specifically the award of P5,000.00 in attorney's fees and expenses of litigation to petitioner Carreon. Petitioner argues that the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for execution, as the judgment for attorney's fees is distinct and independent from the main election protest and has become final, making its execution a ministerial duty.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disallowing petitioner's motion for execution of the final judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. SP-01824-R. Whether the pendency of the main election protest case can serve as a valid ground to deny the execution of a final and executory judgment awarding attorney's fees and expenses.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The orders of the respondent court dated April 2, 1975, May 26, 1975, and September 22, 1975, are set aside, and the respondent court is directed to issue the corresponding writ to enforce the final judgment in CA-G.R. No. SP-01824-R.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion and the execution of a final judgment: The Court held that the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the motion for execution. The settled rule is that once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution. The issuance of such a writ is considered a ministerial duty of the court, which can be compelled by mandamus. The Court emphasized that "an execution is the fruit and end of the suit, and is very aptly called the life of the law." The judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-01824-R, which explicitly ordered private respondent Adasa to pay petitioner P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, had become final. Therefore, the respondent court had a ministerial duty to order its execution. On the issue of the pendency of the main election protest: The Court clarified that the judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-01824-R, awarding attorney's fees and expenses, is distinct and independent from the judgment in the main election protest case (CA-G.R. No. SP-02029-R). The pendency of the latter case cannot serve as an obstacle to the execution of the former, which had already attained finality. The Court further noted that even the judgment in the election protest case had, in the meantime, become final, further negating any reason for delaying the execution of the attorney's fees award.
Main Doctrine
The issuance of a writ of execution for a final judgment is a ministerial duty of the court, compellable by mandamus, and the pendency of a separate, independent case cannot be an obstacle to its execution.