Dangwa Transportation Co. v. Sarmiento
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: On March 16, 1964, Lawrence Heller, an American citizen stationed at Clark Air Base, Pampanga, filed a civil action for damages against James G. Gayot, the driver, and Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc., the owner, of a bus. Heller alleged that on December 30, 1963, the bus, driven by Gayot, collided with his motorcycle on Kennon Road, Tuba, Benguet, causing him serious physical injuries and wrecking his motorcycle. Procedural History: The action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case No. 2515. The petitioners, Dangwa Transportation Co., Inc. and James G. Gayot, filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing that venue was improperly laid. They contended that Heller's assignment to Clark Air Base was temporary and that his residence, for venue purposes, should be considered Baguio City or Benguet, Mountain Province, not Pampanga. The respondent judge, Malcolm G. Sarmiento, denied this motion, finding that Heller's actual residence was in Clark Air Base, Pampanga, and thus the action was properly instituted there. The Petition: The petitioners seek a writ of prohibition, arguing that the Court of First Instance of Pampanga gravely abused its discretion in denying their motion to dismiss based on improper venue. They specifically question whether Heller's assignment to Clark Air Base constituted a residence for the purpose of venue under Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, contending it should have been Baguio City or Benguet. The Supreme Court is asked to determine the correct venue for the action.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch I, committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
Ruling
The petition is without merit and is hereby dismissed. The Court of First Instance of Pampanga did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the term 'resides' in the rules of venue for personal actions refers to the actual residence or place of abode of the parties, which may be distinguished from their legal domicile. Citing Koh v. Court of Appeals, the Court emphasized that residence is the place of physical habitation, whether permanent or temporary, whereas domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence with an intent to return. The Court noted that Section 2(b) of Rule 4 utilizes the words 'resides or may be found,' indicating that the law aims to provide the greatest convenience possible to litigants by focusing on accessibility to the courts. Applying the principle from Uytengsu v. Republic, the Court reiterated that a person can have but one domicile but may have numerous places of residence. Since Lawrence Heller was consistently and continuously residing at Clark Air Base at the time he filed the action, he fulfilled the requirement of 'actual residence' in Pampanga. Therefore, the respondent Judge did not err in maintaining jurisdiction over the case, as venue for personal actions is determined by the actual habitation of the party at the commencement of the suit.
Main Doctrine
For purposes of venue in personal actions under Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, 'residence' refers to the actual place of abode, whether permanent or temporary, as distinguished from 'domicile,' which denotes a fixed permanent residence with the intention of returning.