Dy Pac & Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed Dy Pac & Company, Inc. with P85,233.02 in forest charges and subcharges and P54,408.23 in sales tax and surcharge, totaling P139,641.25, for the period from April 1961 to May 1963. The company protested this assessment, requesting its cancellation or withdrawal. 2. Procedural History: Dy Pac & Company, Inc. protested the assessment on April 19, 1967. The Commissioner denied this protest on July 3, 1967, and reiterated the demand for payment on October 18, 1967, stating it was the final decision and demanding payment within thirty days, or collection would be enforced and criminal prosecution recommended. The company then wrote to the Secretary of Finance on December 2, 1967, who endorsed the request to the Commissioner. On May 23, 1968, the Commissioner reiterated his demand. Dy Pac & Company, Inc. filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals on July 5, 1968. 3. The Petition: The petitioner sought review of the Commissioner's assessment, arguing that the appealable decision was the Commissioner's letter dated May 23, 1968, which they received on June 5, 1968. This would make their July 5, 1968, petition timely. The respondents contended that the appealable decision was the Commissioner's letter dated October 18, 1967, which the petitioner received on November 7, 1967, making the petition filed with the Court of Tax Appeals untimely. The Supreme Court reviewed whether the October 18, 1967 letter constituted a final, appealable decision under Republic Act No. 1125.
Issue(s)
Whether the letter dated May 23, 1968, from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, reiterating the demand for payment, constituted the appealable decision. Whether the petition for review filed on July 5, 1968, was filed within the 30-day period prescribed by Republic Act No. 1125.
Ruling
The dismissal of the petitioner's appeal by the Court of Tax Appeals is affirmed. The assessment in question had become final and executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On whether the letter dated May 23, 1968, constituted the appealable decision: The Court held that the appealable decision was the letter dated October 18, 1967, which the petitioner received on November 7, 1967. This letter contained the Commissioner's final decision denying the protest and explicitly stated that the request for cancellation was denied after careful consideration of the facts, law, and jurisprudence. The Commissioner himself considered this letter as his "decision" that was final, as evidenced by his request for payment for the "last time" and the threat of collection and criminal prosecution. Subsequent communications, such as the letter of May 23, 1968, were merely reiterations of this prior final decision and did not alter its nature. The Court emphasized that the Commissioner's prior actions were tentative until his final resolution, which was clearly communicated in the October 18, 1967 letter. The Court also noted that the Commissioner's reply to the Secretary of Finance explicitly stated that the October 18, 1967 letter was a "decision on the taxpayer's administrative protest." On whether the petition for review was filed within the 30-day period: The Court ruled that the 30-day period to appeal commenced on November 7, 1967, the date petitioner received the Commissioner's final decision dated October 18, 1967. Therefore, the period to appeal expired on December 7, 1967. The petition for review was filed with the CTA on July 5, 1968, which was significantly beyond the reglementary period. The Court further stated that even if the request to the Secretary of Finance were considered to have suspended the period, the appeal would still be late. Counting from November 7, 1967, to December 2, 1967 (when the request to the Secretary of Finance was sent), 25 days elapsed. From June 5, 1968 (receipt of the May 23, 1968 letter) to July 5, 1968 (filing of the petition), another 30 days elapsed, making the appeal late by 25 days. The Court stressed that the period to appeal is jurisdictional and non-extendible, and failure to file seasonably is fatal. The Court also noted that the Secretary of Finance is not authorized by law to review decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, rendering the request to him ineffective in suspending the appeal period.
Main Doctrine
The 30-day period to appeal a decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Court of Tax Appeals commences from the date of receipt of the Commissioner's final decision on a disputed assessment, and not from the receipt of subsequent communications that merely reiterate or are considered pro-forma requests for reconsideration.