United States v. Hernandez
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Eustasio Hernandez and Catalina Mago were charged with adultery. Eustasio Hernandez admitted to illicit relations with Catalina Mago, who was married to Mariano del Pilar. The defense presented was the alleged consent of Mariano del Pilar to these relations. Procedural History: The defendants were tried in the Court of First Instance of Ambos Camarines, found guilty of adultery, and sentenced accordingly. They appealed the judgment of conviction and the imposed sentences to the Supreme Court. The Appeal: The defendants appealed the decision of the Court of First Instance. The primary argument, as presented in the defense, was the alleged consent of the offended spouse, Mariano del Pilar, to the adulterous acts committed by Eustasio Hernandez and Catalina Mago. The appellants sought to overturn their conviction based on this defense.
Issue(s)
Whether the consent of the offended spouse to the commission of adultery constitutes a valid defense against a charge of adultery under Act No. 1773. Whether the evidence presented sufficiently proved the consent of the offended spouse.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of First Instance. It held that the evidence was insufficient to prove the consent of the offended spouse. More importantly, it ruled that even if such consent were proven, it would not constitute a valid defense under Act No. 1773, as adultery is a public crime.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Court definitively ruled that under Act No. 1773, the consent of the offended spouse to the commission of adultery is not a valid defense. This is because Act No. 1773 transformed adultery from a private crime into a public crime. The substantive criminal law was materially changed, destroying the right of condonation, pardon, and remission of penalty, except in specified instances. Consequently, the defense that the injured spouse had consented to the adulterous acts was completely abrogated. The Court emphasized that the intent of the legislature in changing private crimes to public crimes was to abolish the distinction and remove the control of the injured person over the criminal liability of the offender, thereby preventing anyone from remitting another's criminal responsibility. This principle is paramount to the public interest and cannot be undermined by private consent to a crime. On Issue 2: The Court reviewed the conflicting evidence presented regarding the alleged consent of Mariano del Pilar, the offended spouse. It found that the evidence adduced by the defendants was insufficient to sustain their allegation of consent. The Court carefully examined the record and found no reason to disturb the conclusions reached by the court below, stating that the evidence fully supported those conclusions. Therefore, the factual basis for the defense of consent was not established.
Main Doctrine
Under Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Commission, adultery was transformed into a public crime, thereby abrogating the defense of consent by the offended spouse. This legislative change removed the injured party's control over the criminal liability of the offenders, aligning adultery with other public offenses where prosecution is based on the paramount interests of the public rather than the private disposition of the victim.