Jalover v. Ytoriaga
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondents Porferio Ytoriaga and Consolacion Lopez filed a complaint against Ana Hedriana and petitioner Fermin Jalover, alleging ownership of an increased portion of land due to the natural change in the course of the Salog River. They claimed continuous possession of this alluviated land since before the war and asserted that the defendants unlawfully surveyed, took possession of, and destroyed plants on this portion. The plaintiffs sought to be declared owners of the increased portion, to have the defendants vacate, and to recover damages and attorney's fees. Petitioner Fermin Jalover, in his defense, claimed the land was a former river bed abandoned less than 10 years prior, rightfully belonging to him as the sole heir of his mother, Ana Hedriana, who owned it. He denied the plaintiffs' possession and demands, and pointed to a prior dismissed ejectment suit filed by the plaintiffs against him. Procedural History: The case, Civil Case No. 5429, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in April 1960. After numerous postponements over six years, the case was dismissed on January 26, 1970, by Judge Ramon Blanco for failure to prosecute, as the private respondents failed to appear. Two years later, on January 17, 1972, the private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on June 23, 1972, by Judge Venicio Escolin, who succeeded Judge Blanco, on the grounds that the dismissal order had become final. Subsequently, the private respondents filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment on July 10, 1972, arguing the dismissal was void due to lack of due process and fraud. This petition was given due course, and on August 24, 1972, Judge Escolin issued an order setting aside the previous dismissal and denial orders and rescheduling the trial. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this order, which was denied on November 10, 1972, leading to the present petition for certiorari. The Petition: Petitioner Fermin Jalover filed this original action for certiorari, seeking to nullify the respondent Judge's Orders dated August 24, 1972, and November 10, 1972. The core argument is that the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, by setting aside the orders of January 26, 1970, and June 23, 1972. Petitioner contends that these earlier orders had long become final and executory and were thus beyond the court's power to disturb. The petition highlights that the dismissal order of January 26, 1970, was served directly upon the private respondents and not their counsel of record, Atty. Amado B. Atol. Petitioner argues that even if Atty. Atol had been appointed Chief of the Secret Service, he had not formally withdrawn as counsel, making service upon him legally required. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the dismissal for failure to prosecute was erroneous as the private respondents had already presented their evidence and rested their case in 1963, meaning the case was past the stage where such a dismissal was appropriate.
Issue(s)
1. Whether the order of dismissal for "failure to prosecute" became final and executory despite being served on the private respondents themselves and not their counsel of record. 2. Whether the non-appearance of private respondents and their counsel at a scheduled hearing, after they had already presented their evidence and rested their case, constitutes a "failure to prosecute." 3. Whether a Petition for Relief from Judgment is the appropriate remedy when the judgment or order complained of has not attained finality.
Ruling
The petition is denied. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on December 27, 1972, is dissolved. No costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the order of dismissal dated January 26, 1970, did not become final and executory. It is uncontroverted that the order was served upon the private respondents themselves and not upon their attorney of record, Atty. Amado B. Atol, and there was no court order directing direct service upon the private respondents. The Court reiterated the settled rule that when a party is represented by counsel, notice must be made upon the counsel, and notice upon the party himself is not considered notice in law unless expressly ordered by the court, pursuant to Rule 13, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court. The term "every written notice" in this rule includes notices of decisions or orders. Furthermore, the argument that Atty. Atol's appointment to a government position negated his role as counsel was rejected; a lawyer's withdrawal must be made in a formal petition, and without such, he remains counsel for all legal purposes, upon whom court processes should be served. Consequently, without proper service on counsel, the period for finality did not commence, and the order of dismissal never became final. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court ruled that the non-appearance of private respondents and their counsel at the January 26, 1970 hearing did not constitute a "failure to prosecute." The record shows that private respondents, as plaintiffs, had already adduced their evidence and rested their case on September 4, 1963, more than six years prior to the dismissal. Therefore, it was the petitioner's turn to present his evidence. In such a posture, private respondents could not possibly be charged with failure to prosecute; they had already diligently pursued their case to the point of resting it. Their absence could only be construed as a waiver of their right to cross-examine the witnesses the petitioner might present and to object to the admissibility of the latter's evidence. To dismiss the case at this stage for 'failure to prosecute' would effectively mean a total disregard of the evidence already presented by the private respondents, thereby denying them one of the cardinal primary rights of a litigant: the right to have their evidence considered by the court. On Issue 3: The Court acknowledged that a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court is generally available only if the judgment or order complained of has already become final and executory. However, as established in the first issue, the order of January 26, 1970, never attained finality due to improper service of notice. Despite this, the Court held that under the circumstances of the case, the petition for relief may be considered as a "second motion for reconsideration or a motion for new trial based on fraud and lack of procedural due process." The Court found that the respondent Judge did not act with abuse of discretion in setting aside the previous orders, implicitly favoring the substantive merits and procedural rectification over a strict adherence to the form of the remedy, given the clear procedural infirmity of the dismissal order.
Main Doctrine
Notice of a dismissal order must be served upon the counsel of record, not directly upon the client, for the order to become final and executory. Failure to prosecute cannot be invoked to dismiss a case when the plaintiffs have already presented their evidence and rested their case.