Baterna v. Workmen's Compensation Commission
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Deceased Magno Baterna was employed by Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. from 1933 until he became ill on January 6, 1964. Due to his illness, he was separated from the service on March 15, 1964, upon the recommendation of the company physician. He subsequently died of Hodgkin's disease on October 25, 1964. Procedural History: On October 22, 1974, Sulpicia Baterna, the surviving spouse, filed a claim for death benefits. The Regional Office No. VII rendered a decision awarding compensation on July 17, 1975. The private respondent sought reconsideration, which was denied, and the case was elevated to the Workmen's Compensation Commission (WCC). On December 31, 1975, the WCC reversed the award and dismissed the claim, holding that it had prescribed after ten years. The Petition: Petitioner Sulpicia Baterna filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, arguing that the WCC erred in dismissing her claim. She contended that the prescriptive period for death benefits should be reckoned from the date of death, not the date of illness, and that the employer had waived its defenses by failing to file a timely notice of controversion.
Issue(s)
Whether the claim for death benefits had prescribed. Whether the employer waived its defenses by failing to file a timely notice of controversion.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. It ordered respondent Bogo-Medellin Milling Co., Inc. to pay claimant Sulpicia Baterna death benefits, expenses for medical and hospital services, attorney's fees to her counsel, and administrative fees to the Commission, plus costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1 (Prescriptive Period): The Court held that the claim for death benefits had not prescribed. The deceased employee died on October 25, 1964, and the claim was filed on October 22, 1974, which is 9 years, 11 months, and 27 days later. This period is well within the ten-year prescriptive period provided by the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Court found the Commission's reliance on the date of illness (January 6, 1964) as the starting point for prescription to be untenable, stating that for death benefits, the prescriptive period logically runs from the date of death. On Issue 2 (Waiver of Defenses): The Court found that the respondent employer had waived its right to controvert the claim. The records showed that the company did not file the prescribed notice of controversion as required by Section 45 of the Workmen's Compensation Act after the employee's separation due to illness. Instead, the company paid gratuity benefits. The notice of controversion filed much later, on November 7, 1971, on the ground that the illness did not arise out of employment, was deemed filed out of time and the defense invoked was considered waived. The Court also noted that even on the merits, the disputable presumption that the illness arose out of or was aggravated by employment had not been sufficiently rebutted.
Main Doctrine
The Supreme Court reiterated that for claims of death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, the ten-year prescriptive period is counted from the date of the employee's death. The Court found the Workmen's Compensation Commission's reliance on the date of illness as the starting point to be untenable. Additionally, the Court affirmed that an employer's failure to file a notice of controversion within the statutory period constitutes a waiver of any defenses, including the prescription of the claim.