Vergel De Dios v. Jarencio
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns an ejectment case filed by petitioner Pilar S. Vergel de Dios against private respondent Procerfina M. Elbo for failure to pay rent on leased premises, specifically Rooms 313 and 408 of the Pilar Building No. 2, used by Elbo as a student dormitory. The City Court of Manila initially ruled in favor of the petitioner, ordering Elbo's ejectment. 2. Procedural History: Following the City Court's judgment of ejectment on April 22, 1976, and after the petitioner secured a writ of execution, the private respondent filed a petition for relief from judgment with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. The respondent judge granted this petition for relief on August 5, 1976, and subsequently denied a motion for reconsideration on August 25, 1976. The petitioner then filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Supreme Court to set aside these orders. 3. The Petition: The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari and mandamus to nullify the CFI's orders granting the petition for relief and denying reconsideration. The core arguments revolve around whether the private respondent's failure to appear at a scheduled hearing constituted excusable neglect or mistake under Rule 38, and whether the CFI gravely abused its discretion in granting relief, thereby unduly delaying the execution of the ejectment judgment. The petitioner contends that the respondent's actions were deliberate maneuvers to prolong her occupancy without paying rent.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting private respondent's petition for relief from the judgment in an ejectment case. Whether certiorari is the proper remedy against the orders granting relief and denying reconsideration. Whether it was proper for the inferior court to issue a writ of execution before the expiration of the period for appeal. Whether a petition for relief under Rule 38 can be filed against a judgment in an ejectment case. Whether the procedure to be followed after granting the petition for relief should be trial de novo in the CFI or a new reception of evidence in the inferior court.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The order of the respondent court dated August 5, 1976, granting the petition for relief, is set aside. The execution of the final decision of the City Court of Manila dated April 22, 1976, may now proceed. Any moneys deposited by respondent Elbo with the courts below should be released to the petitioner in partial payment of the monetary aspect of the judgment.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for relief: The Court held that the respondent court gravely abused its discretion in granting the petition for relief. The failure of respondent Elbo and her counsel to appear at the hearing on March 30, 1976, could not be attributed to mistake or excusable neglect. The records showed a pattern of undue delay in the proceedings, characterized by numerous postponements and resettings, many of which were secured by the respondent's counsel. The abrupt change of counsel and the alleged possibility of compromise were seen as transparent excuses and maneuvers to delay the ejectment action, rendering the summary nature of the suit meaningless. The Court emphasized that Rule 38 cannot be used as an excuse for continued occupation of leased premises without paying rentals pending judgment, as this would be unfair to the lessor. On the propriety of certiorari as a remedy: While ordinarily, the remedy against an order granting relief under Rule 38 is appeal after a new judgment is rendered, certiorari may be availed of when, as in this case, the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion. The Court found that the summary nature of the ejectment suit was practically rendered meaningless by the protraction of the trial through various maneuvers by the lessee, justifying the resort to certiorari. On the issuance of the writ of execution: The Court noted that the issuance of the writ of execution before the expiration of the period for appeal was a procedural matter that was overtaken by the filing of the petition for relief and the subsequent orders of the respondent court. However, the primary issue revolved around the propriety of granting the relief itself, which the Court found to be an abuse of discretion. On the applicability of Rule 38 to ejectment cases: The Court did not explicitly rule on whether Rule 38 can be filed against a judgment in an ejectment case. However, by finding grave abuse of discretion in its application to delay the proceedings, the implication is that while technically possible, it is subject to strict scrutiny, especially in summary actions. On the procedure after granting relief: The Court acknowledged the plausible view that Republic Act 6031, which abolished trial de novo in appeals from inferior courts to the Courts of First Instance, might have modified Section 7 of Rule 38. Under RA 6031, the appellate function of the CFI became a review of recorded evidence, not a retrial. However, the Court deemed it unnecessary to make a definitive ruling on this procedural point, as its main conclusion was that the respondent court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the set-aside orders in the first place.
Main Doctrine
The grant of a petition for relief under Rule 38 by a respondent court constitutes grave abuse of discretion when the circumstances clearly indicate that the failure to appear in the inferior court was not due to mistake or excusable neglect, but rather a deliberate tactic to delay the summary proceedings of an ejectment case. Such use of Rule 38 undermines the expeditious nature of ejectment suits and is unfair to the lessor.