People v. Quizon
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioners Federico Quizon and Profitisa Quizon were charged with serious oral defamation in two separate criminal complaints filed on May 11, 1964, for offenses allegedly committed on November 11, 1963. Procedural History: Upon arraignment, petitioners filed a motion to quash, arguing that the offense had prescribed as of May 9, 1964, based on their computation of the six-month prescriptive period under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. The Municipal Court denied the motion, adopting a different mode of computation presented by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal. The Petition: Petitioners sought a writ of certiorari and prohibition to nullify the orders denying their motion to quash and to prohibit further proceedings, asserting that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion by disregarding established jurisprudence on the computation of prescriptive periods.
Issue(s)
Whether the 'six months' prescriptive period for oral defamation under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code is computed as 180 days (30 days per month) or based on the actual number of days in the calendar months. Whether the first day of the prescriptive period (the day of the commission/discovery of the crime) is excluded or included in the computation. Whether certiorari is the proper remedy to challenge the denial of a motion to quash based on the prescription of the offense.
Ruling
The petition is granted, and the criminal complaints in the aforementioned cases are ordered dismissed.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: Prescription Computation: The Supreme Court held that the term 'month' in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) must be interpreted as a 30-day month in accordance with Article 13 of the Civil Code. The Court emphasized that while the Revised Administrative Code once defined 'month' as a calendar month, the enactment of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 386) signaled a return to the 30-day month rule for general application in the interpretation of laws. Since the RPC is a special law that is deficient in defining the length of a month, Article 18 of the Civil Code directs that such deficiency be supplied by Civil Code provisions. Therefore, a six-month prescriptive period is exactly 180 days. The respondent judge's method of using calendar days for months 'designated by name' was rejected as it would render the 30-day rule in Article 13 nugatory. On Issue 2: Rule on Excluding/Including Days: Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code and the precedent in People v. Del Rosario, the Court reaffirmed that in computing a period, the first day is excluded and the last day is included. The prescriptive period for the offense committed on November 11, 1963, began to run on November 12, 1963. Counting 180 days from November 12, 1963, the period expired on May 9, 1964. Because the information was filed only on May 11, 1964, the offense had already prescribed. The Court noted that even if the year 1964 was a leap year (adding a 29th day to February), the total count of 180 days remains the absolute limit for a six-month prescriptive period. On Issue 3: Propriety of Certiorari: The Court ruled that although a denial of a motion to quash is generally an interlocutory order not subject to certiorari, an exception is warranted when the prescription of the offense is indisputable. To require an accused to undergo the 'ordeals of trial and conviction' when the complaint is patently defective due to prescription is 'unfair and unjust.' In such circumstances, the ordinary remedy of appeal is considered inadequate, and the higher court may intervene via certiorari and prohibition to prevent a waste of judicial resources and protect the rights of the accused.
Main Doctrine
The computation of the prescriptive period for offenses, particularly oral defamation, must strictly adhere to the provisions of Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code and Article 13 of the Civil Code, which defines a month as a 30-day period unless otherwise specified by name. The period commences from the day the offense is committed or discovered, excluding the first day and including the last.