Leynes v. Veloso
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Atty. Benjamin H. Virrey filed a complaint for immorality in public office against Municipal Judge Pedro D. Veloso of General Nakar, Quezon, for having illicit relations with a concubine under scandalous circumstances. Judge Veloso, married since 1955, had three children with Ligaya Veluz. He admitted that Gloria Tropicales, 37 years old, is his mistress, and they have two children born in 1970 and 1972. Judge Veloso invoked Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code and claimed his wife, Rosario V. Veluz (Ligaya in the marriage certificate), condoned his acts of concubinage through an affidavit, stating she chose Gloria to serve him like a wife due to a vehicular accident in 1955 that broke his thighbone. Complainant Virrey later withdrew his complaint based on his conviction that Mrs. Veloso hired her husband's mistress to care for him. Felix Leynes, who had a separate complaint against Judge Veloso for alleged partiality in acquitting Ricardo and Esperidion Pujeda, adopted Virrey's charge of immorality. Leynes' counsel argued that the inhabitants of the town would lose confidence in an immoral judge who violates the law, especially since the respondent lives with his concubine across the municipal hall. Procedural History: The case involved administrative complaints against Municipal Judge Pedro D. Veloso. The Investigating Judge received an affidavit from complainant Virrey withdrawing his complaint. Respondent Judge's counsel argued for exoneration due to lack of evidence as the complainant did not appear at the hearing. The Petition: The core issue was whether Judge Veloso's conduct constituted immorality in public office and if his wife's condonation or the complainant's withdrawal of the charge warranted dismissal of the administrative case.
Issue(s)
Whether a judge's admission of concubinage in a memorandum or pleading constitutes a judicial confession that obviates the need for further evidence. Whether the condonation of the spouse or the withdrawal of an administrative complaint by a private party extinguishes the administrative liability of a judge for immorality.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that Municipal Judge Pedro D. Veloso should be dismissed from office due to his immoral conduct. His application for disability retirement was disapproved. The Court held that his moral delinquency renders him unfit for the office of municipal judge and warrants his removal. The Court also stated that the withdrawal of the charge by complainant Virrey does not render the administrative case moot, as the Court may motu proprio investigate a judge for continuing, grossly immoral conduct.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court ruled that because the respondent admitted to the commission of concubinage in his pleadings, the charge was conclusively established as a judicial confession under Section 2, Rule 129 and Sections 22 and 29, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. A judicial confession does not require further proof, and the respondent's contention that the lack of testimony at a hearing warranted dismissal was held to be 'preposterous.' The Court emphasized that administrative proceedings against judges are not strictly adversarial between two private parties but are an exercise of the Court's supervisory power over the judiciary. Consequently, the withdrawal of a charge by a complainant like Atty. Virrey does not render the case moot, as the Court may proceed motu proprio to investigate and discipline a judge for grossly immoral conduct. The focus remains on the respondent's fitness for office rather than the persistence of the accuser. On Issue 2: The Court held that the respondent erroneously equated the extinction of criminal liability with his moral fitness to occupy the position of a town magistrate. While condonation by a spouse under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) might prevent criminal prosecution for concubinage, it does not erase the moral delinquency that renders a judge unfit for office under Section 97 of the Judiciary Law. The Court declared that a judge who maintains a mistress in defiance of community mores suffers from 'moral obtuseness' and violates Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Even if a spouse is not 'fastidious' enough to object to the concubinage, the judiciary must maintain a standard of irreproachable behavior that does not outrage public decency. The Court concluded that the respondent's conduct was highly unconventional and censurable, necessitating his removal from the bench to protect the integrity of the administration of justice.
Main Doctrine
A municipal judge who commits concubinage is dismissed from office due to immoral conduct, rendering him unfit for the position, irrespective of his wife's condonation or the complainant's withdrawal of the charge. Moral delinquency is not tolerated in the judiciary.