People v. Ramos
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Two criminal cases were filed against Socorro C. Ramos for alleged violations of the Copyright Law (Act 3134), specifically for selling and distributing spurious copies of a copyrighted textbook. The alleged offenses occurred between July and September 1963. The informations were filed on September 3, 1965. Procedural History: Accused Ramos filed motions to quash both cases, alleging prescription. The prosecution argued that the offense was continuing and the prescriptive period should be counted from September 3, 1963, or that the filing of proceedings in the fiscal's office interrupted prescription. The defense countered that even if the offense was continuing, the prescriptive period, considering the leap year 1964, expired on September 2, 1965, making the filing on September 3, 1965, one day late. The trial courts rendered conflicting rulings: one dismissed the case (Branch XIV) on the ground of prescription, finding it filed one day late; the other denied the motion to quash (Branch III), holding the filing was within the prescriptive period. The Petition: The People appealed the dismissal order (G.R. No. L-25265). Socorro C. Ramos filed a special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the denial of her motion to quash (G.R. No. L-25644). The two cases were consolidated.
Issue(s)
Whether the special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus is the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash on the ground of prescription. Whether Act No. 3326, providing a four-year prescriptive period for violations of special laws, is applicable to violations of the Copyright Law. Whether the two-year prescriptive period under Section 24 of the Copyright Law, Act 3134, was correctly computed, specifically concerning the leap year 1964. Whether the filing of preliminary investigation proceedings interrupts the prescriptive period for offenses under the Copyright Law. Whether the offense charged was a continuing one and when the prescriptive period commenced.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 80007 and reversed the denial of the motion to quash in Criminal Case No. 80006, ordering the dismissal of both cases on the ground of prescription. The Court held that the special civil action was proper, Act 3326 was inapplicable, and the two-year prescriptive period had expired.
Ratio Decidendi
On the propriety of the special civil action: The Court found that a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition was a proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash on the ground of prescription. Allowing an accused to undergo trial and conviction when the offense has indisputably prescribed is considered unfair and unjust, rendering the ordinary remedy of appeal not plain and adequate. While mandamus might not be strictly applicable as quashing an information is not a ministerial function, certiorari and prohibition provided sufficient relief. On the applicability of Act No. 3326: The Court ruled that Act No. 3326, which provides a four-year prescriptive period for violations of special acts unless otherwise provided, is not applicable in this case. The Copyright Law (Act 3134) explicitly provides its own prescriptive period of two years in Section 24. Act 3326 applies only when the special act does not specify its own prescriptive period, which is not the situation here. On the computation of the prescriptive period and the leap year: The Court held that the two-year prescriptive period under the Copyright Law had expired. The prescriptive period commenced on September 3, 1963. The Court reiterated the ruling in Namarco vs. Tuazon that February 28 and 29 of a leap year should be counted as separate days in computing periods of prescription. Since 1964 was a leap year, the two-year period consisted of 730 days. Therefore, the 730th day from September 3, 1963, fell on September 2, 1965. The filing of the information on September 3, 1965, was one day late. On the interruption of prescription by preliminary investigation: The Court clarified that the filing of preliminary investigation proceedings in the fiscal's office or the Department of Justice does not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period. Citing People vs. Tayco, the Court held that prescription is interrupted only by the filing of the complaint or information in court, not by the act of reporting the offense to the authorities. On the nature of the offense and commencement of prescription: The Court found no merit in the argument that the prescriptive period should start from September 4, 1963. The accused was charged with selling and distributing pirated books, not merely illegal possession. The evidence showed a sale on September 3, 1963. Therefore, the prescriptive period correctly commenced on September 3, 1963, the date of the last alleged offense.
Main Doctrine
The two-year prescriptive period under the Copyright Law, Act 3134, is computed by counting February 28 and 29 of a leap year as separate days. The filing of a criminal information interrupts the prescriptive period, not preliminary investigations.