Bachrach Motor Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: In 1958, a labor dispute arose between petitioner Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. (operating as Rural Transit) and the Rural Transit Employees Association, leading to a strike. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) intervened, ordering the strikers back to work and management to reinstate them under previous terms. Subsequently, Bachrach sought authority to dismiss driver Maximo Jacob due to alleged violations of the Motor Vehicle Law, citing a June 9, 1961 incident that resulted in the destruction of a company bus and injuries. 2. Procedural History: The employee's association, representing Jacob, denied the charges, attributing the accident to a mechanical defect. The CIR heard Bachrach's petition, but the sole witness, general manager Joseph Kaplin, failed to appear for cross-examination after leaving the country. The employee's association then moved to strike Kaplin's testimony, dismiss the company's petition, and reinstate Jacob with backwages. The CIR granted this motion on March 1, 1966, dismissing Bachrach's petition and ordering Jacob's reinstatement with backwages. 3. The Petition: Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court on June 15, 1966, challenging the CIR's order. The petition argues that the CIR erred in dismissing its petition after striking Kaplin's testimony, in its handling of documentary exhibits, in ordering Jacob's reinstatement without sufficient evidence, and in granting backwages without proof of Jacob's diligence in seeking other employment. The Supreme Court affirmed the CIR's order, modifying it to award three years of backwages.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) correctly ordered the striking of Joseph Kaplin's testimony due to his unavailability for cross-examination. Whether the documentary exhibits (Exhibits 1 to 8-F) were sufficient to prove the charges against the employee despite the striking of the testimonial evidence. Whether the award of backwages from the date of suspension to reinstatement was proper and what the reasonable period for such an award should be.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the CIR dated March 1, 1966, with the modification that petitioner shall pay driver Maximo Jacob three (3) years' backwages at the rate of his last salary received before suspension, without qualification and deduction. Costs were against the petitioner.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent court did not err in ordering the dismissal of the petition after striking Kaplin's testimony. The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings is a fundamental right that forms part of the constitutional guarantee of due process. Applying the rule in Ortigas Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines, oral testimony is only competent if it is complete, which requires that the witness be wholly cross-examined or that the right to cross-examine is lost through the fault of the adverse party. In this instance, Kaplin's failure to appear for cross-examination was due to his leaving for abroad, a cause attributable to the party offering him as a witness. Because the cross-examination could not be completed, the uncompleted testimony was correctly rendered incompetent and could not form part of the evidence. Therefore, the removal of the testimony was a valid exercise of protecting the union's right to due process. On Issue 2: The Court held that the documentary exhibits admitted by the CIR for "whatever worth they may have" did not constitute competent proof of the truthfulness of their contents. While the union's counsel admitted the signatures on the documents, this was not an admission of the veracity of the statements contained therein. Without the supporting testimony of a witness like Kaplin to verify the intrinsic value and truth of these records, the exhibits remained hearsay. As the petitioner failed to call other witnesses to identify the documents or testify to the facts alleged, there was no competent evidence to substantiate the charges of negligence against Maximo Jacob. Consequently, the dismissal of the petition to discharge the driver was the only logical outcome in the absence of admissible evidence. On Issue 3: Regarding backwages, the Court modified the CIR's order by applying the 'Mercury Drug' rule, which fixes a reasonable period for payment to avoid protracted post-judgment litigation. The Court explained that the philosophy behind this rule is to prevent delays inherent in proving or disproving a worker's earnings from other sources during the period of their illegal dismissal. Under this doctrine, the burden of proof regarding the employee's other earnings is effectively set aside in favor of a standardized award. Following the principle established in Mercury Drug Co., Inc. v. CIR and subsequent cases, the Court determined that three (3) years of backwages is fair and reasonable. This award is to be paid at the rate of the last salary received before suspension, without qualification or deduction, ensuring a prompt and final resolution of the monetary dispute.
Main Doctrine
The uncompleted testimony of a witness, when cross-examination is not completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, is rendered incompetent and cannot be considered as evidence. Exhibits sought to be proven by such testimony are considered hearsay without supporting testimony.