Bersabal v. Salvador
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondents Tan That and Ong Pin Tee initiated an ejectment suit against petitioner Purita Bersabal in the City Court of Caloocan City. Following a decision by the City Court, petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance of Caloocan City. Procedural History: The petitioner's appeal was docketed as Civil Case No. C-2036. The respondent court issued an order directing the Clerk of Court to transmit the stenographic notes and granting parties thirty days from receipt of the order to file memoranda, after which the case would be submitted for decision. Petitioner received the order on April 17, 1971. Petitioner filed a motion to submit memorandum within 30 days from notice of the transcript's submission, which was granted. However, before petitioner received notice, the respondent judge dismissed the appeal on August 4, 1971, for failure to prosecute. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on October 30, 1971, and a subsequent motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration was denied on March 15, 1972. The Petition: Petitioner seeks to annul the respondent judge's orders of August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971, and March 15, 1972, and to compel the respondent judge to decide the perfected appeal based on the evidence and records submitted. The core legal question is whether the failure to submit a memorandum, as contemplated by Section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031, empowers the Court of First Instance to dismiss an appeal for failure to prosecute, or if the court is mandated to decide the case on the merits using the transmitted records.
Issue(s)
Whether the failure of an appellant to submit a memorandum on time empowers the Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal for failure to prosecute, or whether it is mandatory for the Court to decide the appealed case on the basis of the transmitted evidence and records. Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal without affording petitioner the opportunity to file her memorandum after the transcript of stenographic notes had been submitted.
Ruling
The Supreme Court set aside the challenged orders of the respondent Judge dated August 4, 1971, October 30, 1971, and March 15, 1972, as null and void, and directed the respondent court to decide Civil Case No. C-2036 on the merits. No costs were awarded.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of dismissal for failure to prosecute due to non-submission of memorandum: The Court held that the second paragraph of Section 45 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended by R.A. No. 6031, mandates that Courts of First Instance shall decide appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts. The provision explicitly states that parties may submit memoranda and/or briefs if so requested. The word "may" is permissive, conferring discretion, while "shall" is imperative, imposing a duty. Therefore, the submission of memoranda is optional for the parties. Consequently, a court cannot dismiss an appeal solely on the ground of an appellant's failure to submit a memorandum on time. Instead, the court is left with no alternative but to decide the case based on the available evidence and records transmitted to it. The Court emphasized that memoranda, briefs, and oral arguments are not essential requirements and are only submitted or made if requested. A contrary interpretation would be unjust and dangerous, potentially defeating a litigant's right to appeal, which should not be deprived except for weighty reasons. On the procedural aspect of the dismissal: The Court found that the respondent Judge dismissed the appeal before the petitioner had received notice of the submission of the transcript of stenographic notes, which was the trigger for the 30-day period to file her memorandum. The petitioner had acted promptly by filing an ex-parte motion to submit her memorandum within the stipulated period after notice, and this motion was granted. The dismissal occurred prematurely and without affording petitioner the opportunity to comply with the procedural requirements after the necessary records were made available. The Court cited Municipality of Tiwi, Albay vs. Cirujales to underscore the need for appellate courts to proceed with caution and not dismiss appeals precipitously, especially when circumstances not attributable to the petitioners caused delays.
Main Doctrine
The failure of an appellant to submit a memorandum on time does not empower the Court of First Instance to dismiss the appeal for failure to prosecute; rather, it is mandatory upon the Court to decide the appealed case on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, as the submission of memoranda is optional for the parties.