Aznar v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-38134 · 1978-09-30 · J. CONCEPCION, JR., J.: · Primary: Remedial; Secondary: Civil
REITERATION

Facts

1. The Antecedents: Petitioners Jesus R. Aznar and Aurora Timber Industries Corporation, and private respondent Ong Brothers Lumber Co., Inc., are logging operators with adjacent timber concessions. The private respondent filed a suit alleging encroachment by the petitioners and removal of timber products. The suit sought to restrain the petitioners and recover damages for the removed wood, plus attorney's fees and litigation expenses. The trial court issued a permanent restraining order and ordered the petitioners to pay P128,384.51 in actual damages, P8,000.00 in attorney's fees, and P2,900.00 in litigation expenses. 2. Procedural History: The petitioners received the trial court's decision on June 9, 1970. They filed their notice of appeal and appeal bond on July 2, 1970, and the record on appeal on July 6, 1970. The trial court approved an amended record on appeal on January 21, 1971, and the case was elevated to the Court of Appeals. The private respondent moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing the record on appeal lacked data showing timely perfection. The Court of Appeals initially denied this motion but later reconsidered and dismissed the appeal on May 7, 1973. 3. The Petition: This is a petition for writs of certiorari and mandamus, seeking to annul the Court of Appeals' dismissal order and compel the appellate court to give due course to the appeal. The petitioners argue that the dismissal was an abuse of discretion, as the appeal was timely perfected. They contend that the omission of certain orders related to the amendment of the record on appeal is not fatal, citing the 'material data rule' and previous Supreme Court rulings that the approval of a record on appeal by the trial court implies its timely perfection, even if certain procedural steps are not explicitly detailed within the record itself.

Issue(s)

Whether the dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Appeals was proper despite the trial court's approval of the amended record on appeal. Whether the non-inclusion of certain interlocutory orders in the record on appeal is fatal to the perfection of the appeal.

Ruling

The petition is granted. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1973, is annulled and set aside, and the respondent appellate court is enjoined to give due course to the appeal. Costs are against the private respondent.

Ratio Decidendi

On the propriety of the dismissal of the appeal: The Court held that the respondent Court of Appeals abused its discretion in dismissing the petitioners' appeal. It is not disputed that the petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond, and record on appeal within the reglementary period, nor was the approval of the record on appeal by the trial court contested. What was disputed was the effect of the non-inclusion of certain orders in the record on appeal. On the effect of non-inclusion of interlocutory orders: The Court reiterated the 'material data rule' found in Section 6, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court. This rule states that where the trial court finds and declares in its order of approval that the record on appeal was filed on time, and this finding is not impugned by the adverse party, the non-inclusion of a motion or order is not fatal and does not warrant dismissal. The appellate court may rely on the trial court's order of approval and its determination of the timeliness of the appeal. The Court cited Berkenkotter vs. Court of Appeals and Pimentel vs. Court of Appeals, among other cases, to support this principle. In these cases, the omission of motions for extension, orders granting extensions, or orders directing amendments from the record on appeal were held not to be fatal when the record on appeal was ultimately approved by the trial court. The approval of the record on appeal by the trial court carries with it the approval of the motion for extension and the determination that the appeal was perfected on time. The Court emphasized that no trial judge would approve a record on appeal that was not timely filed. Furthermore, the Court noted that the amended record on appeal was filed within the ten-day period granted by the trial court, and the issue of timeliness was no longer a jurisdictional question but one of compliance with the trial court's order, which rested on the trial court's sound discretion.

Main Doctrine

The approval of a record on appeal by the trial court, which carries with it the determination of its timeliness, is generally binding on the appellate court, and the omission of certain interlocutory orders within the record on appeal is not necessarily fatal if the timeliness of the appeal is otherwise established or undisputed.

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