Hurtado v. Judalena
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondent Isabel G. Judalena filed a complaint against petitioner Palmarin Q. Hurtado for allegedly encroaching on her property by building a concrete fence beyond the 75 square meters sold and constructing a house on the encroached portion. Judalena prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction. Procedural History: Petitioner Hurtado denied the encroachment. Respondent Judge Arsenio M. Gonong, despite being the brother of the private respondent, issued an ex-parte order for a writ of preliminary injunction. Subsequently, the judge voluntarily disqualified himself due to his relationship with the plaintiff and ordered the transmittal of the records. Petitioner filed a motion for dissolution of the injunction, which the respondent judge denied. The Petition: Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to annul the order of April 2, 1975, and April 21, 1975, on the ground that the respondent judge issued the order in violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge acted in violation of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court by issuing a preliminary injunction in a case where the plaintiff is his sister.
Ruling
The petition is granted. The order dated April 2, 1975, issued in Civil Case No. 485-IV of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, is annulled and set aside. The temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme Court is made permanent.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court is mandatory and leaves no room for ambiguity. It expressly prohibits a judge from sitting in any case where he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity. In this instance, it was undisputed that Judge Gonong is the brother of Isabel Judalena, which constitutes a first-degree relationship. The Court emphasized that the judge's action in taking cognizance of the case and issuing an ex-parte preliminary injunction despite this relationship was reprehensible. Relying on the precedents of Mateo v. Villaluz and People v. Ancheta, the Court underscored that such conduct erodes the essential public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. The fact that the judge later inhibited himself did not validate the prior issuance of an order that was born from a prohibited exercise of authority. Consequently, the order of April 2, 1975, was issued with grave abuse of discretion and must be annulled to uphold the integrity of judicial proceedings.
Main Doctrine
A judge is mandatorily disqualified from sitting in a case where he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, and any order issued in violation of this mandatory prohibition is reprehensible and subject to annulment.