Lambiquit v. Marave
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns a parcel of land originally owned by Santiago Lambiquit. In 1933, Santiago sold the land to Vicente Candia, predecessor-in-interest of the private respondents. Following Vicente's death, his widow, Clara Vda. de Candia, continued managing the land and filed a homestead application. The Lambiquit family, represented by petitioners, has repeatedly attempted to assert ownership and possession over the land, leading to accusations of theft and physical injury against Juan Lambiquit in 1946, and a forcible entry case filed by the Candias in 1950 which they won in the Justice of the Peace Court and the Court of First Instance. Santiago Lambiquit's contest of Clara Candia's homestead application was dismissed in 1955. 2. Procedural History: The Candias enjoyed possession until 1974 when the Lambiquits again disturbed them. This led the Candias to file a complaint for quieting of title in Civil Case No. OZ-477 before the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II. The respondent Judge Geronimo Marave initially appointed the clerk of court as receiver on October 1, 1974. Subsequently, on December 27, 1974, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued against the Lambiquits. The Lambiquits posted a counterbond to dissolve the injunction, but on March 4, 1975, the respondent Judge issued an order prohibiting all parties from entering the land to maintain peace. This order was denied reconsideration on March 24, 1975. On June 17, 1975, Oscar Gula was appointed receiver, with authority to prevent intruders. The Lambiquits' motion to lift the injunction and set aside the March 4 and June 17 orders was denied on June 27, 1975, with the judge ruling that Presidential Decree No. 605 did not apply as the land was private property. Sgt. Gula was later relieved as receiver, and Acting Chief of Police Delfin Rodriguez was appointed in his stead. 3. The Petition: The petitioners, the Lambiquit family, filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul the orders of March 4, 1975, and June 17, 1975, and to restrain the respondent Judge from enforcing them. They argue that these orders are in direct defiance of Presidential Decree No. 605 and that their claim to the land is superior due to the alleged illegality of the 1933 sale of the homestead to Vicente Candia, which they contend violates Section 118 of the Public Land Act. The Supreme Court found the petition without merit, stating that the issue of ownership is a factual matter for the lower court to resolve and that the respondent judge's actions were aimed at preserving peace and protecting the receiver, not violating the decree.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the orders dated March 4, 1975, and June 17, 1975, prohibiting the parties from entering the land and appointing a receiver. Whether the issuance of the preliminary injunction and the subsequent orders violated Presidential Decree No. 605.
Ruling
The petition is without merit and is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners. The orders of March 4, 1975, and June 17, 1975, are sustained.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the issue of who has a better right to the possession of the disputed parcel of land, or the ownership thereof, is a question of fact that has yet to be tried and resolved in the court below. Therefore, it is not a proper ground for setting aside the writ of preliminary injunction or the subsequent orders. The petitioners' reliance on Santiago Lambiquit's homestead application to prove a better right was unavailing, especially since Clara R. Vda. de Candia's subsequent homestead application for the same land was given due course, and Santiago Lambiquit's protest against it was dismissed. The Court found no grave abuse of discretion in the respondent Judge's actions, as the orders were aimed at preserving peace and order and protecting the receiver appointed to manage the property. On Issue 2: The Supreme Court found no flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 605. While the writ of preliminary injunction was issued after the decree's enactment, it was undisputed that the respondent Judge had appointed a receiver for the disputed property prior to the decree's promulgation. The issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction was merely to protect the receiver from reported clandestine incursions by the petitioners and to preserve peace and order in the locality. The respondent Judge correctly ruled that Presidential Decree No. 605 did not apply because, under Republic Act No. 1942, the land in question was no longer public land but private property, and the appointment of a receiver predated the decree.
Main Doctrine
A petition for certiorari and prohibition is not the proper remedy to resolve factual issues of ownership and possession, which are within the jurisdiction of the trial court. The Supreme Court will not interfere with the trial court's discretion in issuing interlocutory orders such as injunctions and receiverships unless there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. The application of Presidential Decree No. 605 must be considered in light of existing laws and the specific circumstances of the case, particularly when interlocutory orders were issued prior to its promulgation.