Acosta-Ofalia v. Sundiam Madrigal
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Private respondents, spouses Jovita Acosta and Clemente Madrigal, filed a complaint against petitioners Carmelita Acosta Ofalia and Flaviana Sipin Vda. de Acosta, and the Manila Banking and Loan Association, for annulment of sale and title with damages. Procedural History: Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied by the respondent Judge. Subsequently, the respondent Judge declared petitioners in default and allowed private respondents to present evidence ex-parte. A decision was rendered based on this ex-parte presentation. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which was "stricken off" as pro forma. A writ of execution was issued. The Petition: Petitioners filed an instant petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction to annul the proceedings and decision, arguing that they were prematurely declared in default.
Issue(s)
Whether the respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the petitioners in default before the expiration of the reglementary period to file an answer.
Ruling
The Supreme Court granted the petition, setting aside the respondent Judge's decision, order of default, and writ of execution. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court ruled that the petitioners were prematurely declared in default. Under Section 4, Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, when a motion to dismiss is denied, the movant shall file his answer within the period prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he received notice of the denial. Applying the then-effective Rule 11, Section 1, the petitioners had fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice on September 24, 1975, to file their answer, meaning their deadline was actually October 9, 1975. By declaring the petitioners in default on September 29, 1975, the trial court acted ten days prematurely. The Court, citing Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation v. Vallejos, emphasized that the period for filing a responsive pleading starts to run all over again upon notice of denial. Because the order of default was premature, it is null and void, along with the ex-parte reception of evidence and the resulting judgment and execution as established in Viacrucis v. Entenzo. Consequently, the respondent Judge's actions constituted a grave abuse of discretion that necessitated the setting aside of the entire default proceedings.
Main Doctrine
A declaration of default is premature and void if made before the expiration of the period for filing an answer, which period recommences from the receipt of notice of the denial of a motion to dismiss.