Rose Industries v. Sentinel Insurance Company
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: Rose Industries, Inc. instituted a civil action against Nemesio Azcueta, Sr., doing business as "Malayan Trading," and Sentinel Insurance Company, Inc. The lawsuit sought the collection of a sum of money, with Sentinel Insurance Company, Inc. named as the surety for Azcueta's obligations. The case was decided by the Court of First Instance of Rizal based on the parties' submitted pleadings and memoranda. 2. Procedural History: The Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision in favor of Rose Industries, Inc. on December 29, 1975. Sentinel Insurance Company, Inc. received this decision on February 5, 1976, and subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on April 12, 1976. Sentinel then filed a notice of appeal and appeal bond on May 7, 1976, along with a motion for an extension to file the record on appeal, which was granted until May 30, 1976. A second motion for extension was filed on June 1, 1976, and granted for five days, making the new deadline June 4, 1976. However, Sentinel filed its record on appeal on June 7, 1976, which was out of time. The trial court dismissed the appeal on July 28, 1976, after denying Sentinel's motion for reconsideration. Sentinel then filed a petition for mandamus with writ of certiorari and preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals initially dismissed Sentinel's petition on November 3, 1976, but later, on February 1, 1977, set aside its own decision, ordered the trial court to give due course to Sentinel's appeal, and maintained a restraining order. 3. The Petition: This case is a petition for review by certiorari filed by Rose Industries, Inc. seeking to set aside the February 1, 1977 resolution of the Court of Appeals. The petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to Sentinel Insurance Company, Inc.'s appeal, which was admittedly perfected out of time. The core issue is whether the appeal, which was filed late and without sufficient legal justification, should be allowed, considering that the delay was attributed to the negligence of Sentinel's counsel and not to any extraordinary circumstances. The petitioner contends that allowing the appeal would merely delay the administration of justice, as the trial court's decision appears to be correct and the surety bond clearly establishes Sentinel's solidary liability.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals (CA) committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the trial court to give due course to an appeal that was filed beyond the reglementary period and after the expiration of the granted extensions.
Ruling
The petition for certiorari is granted. The resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 1, 1977, is set aside, and its decision promulgated on November 3, 1976, is reinstated. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XV, in Civil Case No. 21248 is declared final and executory.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court (SC) rules that the requirements of the Rules of Court (ROC) regarding the period to perfect an appeal are not only mandatory but are likewise jurisdictional, as held in Miranda v. Guanzon. Applying the doctrine in Garganta v. Court of Appeals, the SC emphasizes that an allowance of an appeal by a lower court after the reglementary period has lapsed does not render the appeal valid, effective, or legal because the judgment has already become final. The Court notes that while Moya v. Barton allows for extensions in the 'interest of justice,' such a motion for extension must be filed before the expiration of the period fixed by law. In this case, Respondent Sentinel filed its second motion for extension on June 1, 1976, which was two days after the first extension expired on May 30, 1976; thus, there was 'no more period to extend.' Furthermore, the Court dismissed the excuse regarding typhoon 'Didang,' observing that Respondent Sentinel had ample time to prepare the record on appeal, which consisted of a mere twelve (12) pages, and failed to do so due to the negligence of counsel. Finally, the SC concludes that since the solidary liability of the surety was clear on the face of the bond and the appeal lacked merit, granting further liberality would merely serve to delay the administration of justice, citing Ong Ching v. Ramolete.
Main Doctrine
The Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to an appeal that was admittedly perfected out of time, where the delay was attributable to the negligence of counsel and there was no legal justification for the extension sought and granted beyond the reglementary period.