Continental Bank v. Tiangco
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a decision on September 26, 1967, ordering Income and Acceptance Corporation, Star Life Insurance Corporation, and Primitivo E. Domingo to solidarily pay Continental Bank P46,300.81 with interest and attorney's fees. This judgment became final and executory as no appeal was filed. The sheriff's return indicated that the judgment debtor, P.E. Domingo, promised to settle the case, but the writ of execution remained unsatisfied. Procedural History: On March 17, 1977, Continental Bank, through its Statutory Receiver, filed a complaint to revive the judgment, alleging partial payments and stating the outstanding balance. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the action had prescribed and that the judgment was void because it was based on evidence received by a deputy clerk of court acting as a commissioner. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss via a minute order. The Petition: Continental Bank appealed the dismissal order under Republic Act 5440.
Issue(s)
Whether the action for revival of judgment had prescribed. Whether the judgment sought to be revived is void for having been based on evidence received by a deputy clerk of court acting as commissioner.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the trial court's order of dismissal, ordering the private respondents to pay the costs.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription: The Court held that the action for revival of judgment had not prescribed. It clarified that a judgment may be executed on motion within five years from its entry or finality. After five years, but before it is barred by the statute of limitations, it may be enforced by action. The prescriptive period for enforcing a judgment by action is ten years, as provided by Article 1144(3) of the Civil Code. In this case, the action was filed on March 17, 1977, which was within ten years from the rendition of the judgment on September 26, 1967. The respondents' calculation of the elapsed time was deemed a palpable error. On the issue of the judgment's validity: The Court found the contention that the judgment is void to be erroneous and unmeritorious. It stated that the judgment is valid and enforceable because it was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction and was not impaired by extrinsic fraud or lack of due process. The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the judgment debtors, who subsequently acquiesced to the judgment's validity by making partial payments. Furthermore, the defendants did not question the delegation of the reception of evidence to the deputy clerk of court in the lower court, nor was there any showing of prejudice, mistake, abuse of discretion, collusion, or collateral fraud. The Court concluded that it was too late for them to question the procedure at that stage.
Main Doctrine
An action for revival of a judgment is subject to a ten-year prescriptive period from the date of its rendition or entry. A judgment is not void for having been based on evidence received by a deputy clerk of court acting as commissioner, especially when the judgment debtors acquiesced to the judgment by making partial payments and did not question the procedure in the lower court.