Sichangco v. The Board of Commissioners of Immigration
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: Petitioner Benito Sichangco, judicially recognized as a Filipino citizen, sought admission for his three minor sons, Si Beng, Si Son, and Si Luna, who arrived in the Philippines from China. These minors were issued certificates of registration and identity by the Philippine Consulate in Hongkong. A Board of Special Inquiry admitted the minors, recognizing them as Filipino citizens and children of the petitioner. The decision was subsequently 'noted' by individual members of the Board of Commissioners. Procedural History: On January 24, 1962, the Secretary of Justice issued Memorandum Order No. 9, setting aside all decisions of the Board of Commissioners that had not met collectively and directing a review of decisions admitting aliens. Pursuant to this, a committee recommended the exclusion of the minors and the revocation of Sichangco's citizenship. On October 26, 1962, the Board of Commissioners, composed of different members, issued a decision reversing the earlier decision and ordering the exclusion of the minors. The petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to annul this exclusion order. The trial court made the injunction permanent, declaring the Board of Commissioners' decision illegal and null and void for being rendered more than a year after the initial decision. The Petition: The respondent Board of Commissioners appealed the trial court's decision, arguing that the Secretary of Justice's Memorandum Order No. 9 was valid, that the individual 'noting' of the decision by the previous Board members did not constitute a valid affirmation, and that their own decision reversing the Board of Special Inquiry's ruling was rendered within the one-year period prescribed by law.
Issue(s)
Whether the individual notation of a BSI decision by members of the Board of Commissioners on different dates constitutes a valid decision of affirmance. Whether the Secretary of Justice had the authority to set aside decisions of the Board of Commissioners via Memorandum Order No. 9. Whether the reversal of the BSI decision by the Board of Commissioners was performed within the one-year prescriptive period required by Section 27(b) of C.A. No. 613.
Ruling
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court. The writ of preliminary injunction was dissolved, and the decision of the Board of Commissioners ordering the exclusion of the minors was upheld. Costs were against the petitioner-appellee.
Ratio Decidendi
On Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that individual action by members of a board renders the purpose of its constitution as a body nugatory. Citing Arocha v. Vivo, the Court emphasized that the Legislature organized the Board of Commissioners precisely so that they should deliberate collectively and exchange views before reaching a conclusion. The powers and duties of such boards may not be exercised by the individual members separately; their acts are official only when done by the members convened in session with a quorum present. In this case, the fact that the previous commissioners 'noted' the decision on different dates proved they did not meet to discuss and vote on the case. Consequently, a mere notation does not constitute an exercise of the power of review motu proprio and does not result in a valid decision of affirmance. On Issue 2: The Secretary of Justice validly issued Memorandum Order No. 9 in the exercise of his power of control and supervision as Department Head under Section 79(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. The Board of Commissioners is under the supervision and control of the Department of Justice, and by virtue of this power, the Secretary can modify, nullify, or set aside the actions of the bureau chiefs under him. Section 37 of Act No. 4007 expressly confers upon Department heads the authority to act directly or to review and revoke any decision of a bureau chief. Therefore, the Secretary was within his rights to set aside decisions that were found to have been rendered without the required collective deliberation. This executive action effectively cleared the way for the new Board to conduct a proper review of the minors' admission. On Issue 3: The one-year prescriptive period under Section 27(b) of C.A. No. 613 refers to the date the resolution of reversal was actually adopted by the Board, not the date of notification or mailing. Following the rulings in Neria v. Commissioner of Immigration and Go Yu Tak Wai v. Vivo, the Court reiterated that the operative date of the Commissioners' action is when the resolution was voted and resolved upon. In this instance, the BOC's decision was dated September 4, 1962, which is well within the one-year period from the BSI decision dated September 11, 1961. The fact that the written decision in extenso was mailed on October 26, 1962, does not vitiate its legality, as the extended opinion naturally relates back to the day the resolution to exclude was adopted. There is no legal requirement in Section 27(b) that the written decision be signed and promulgated within the one-year period; it suffices that the deliberation and vote occurred within that timeframe.
Main Doctrine
The Secretary of Justice, by virtue of his power of control over the Bureau of Immigration, can validly set aside decisions of the Board of Commissioners. Furthermore, the individual 'noting' of a decision by members of the Board of Commissioners does not constitute a valid collective decision or exercise of their power of review; a valid decision requires collective deliberation and action. The operative date of the Commissioners' action is when the resolution to reverse was adopted, not necessarily when the extended decision was prepared or mailed, provided it is within the statutory period.