Sunga v. De Guzman
REITERATIONFacts
The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns the ownership and possession of a fishpond. Five of the nine legitimate heirs of the deceased spouses Juan de Guzman and Lucia Montemayor sold their respective shares in the property to Feliciano Sibug for P700.00 via a private deed of sale in 1947. The plaintiffs-appellees, three of the nine heirs, did not sign this deed and claim ownership of their three-ninth portion of the property. The defendants-appellants, who are successors to Feliciano Sibug, have been in physical possession of the fishpond since the execution of the deed of sale. Procedural History: The plaintiffs-appellees instituted an action against the defendants-appellants on February 5, 1962, demanding their rightful shares of the fishpond and an accounting of harvests from 1947. The Court of First Instance of Pampanga ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, declaring them absolute owners of the three-ninth portion and ordering the defendants to convey the said portion, render an accounting of harvests, and pay attorney's fees. The defendants-appellants appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's ruling. The petitioners-appellants are now seeking review of the Court of Appeals' decision through this petition for certiorari. The Petition: The petitioners-appellants are seeking review of the Court of Appeals' decision via a petition for certiorari. Their primary defense against the respondents-appellees' claim for their inherited shares is the plea of prescription, arguing that they have acquired ownership through acquisitive and extinctive prescription due to adverse possession of the entire fishpond since 1948. They contend that the lower courts erred in disregarding their claim of prescription, the testimony regarding their possession, and the alleged knowledge of the sale by the respondents. The petitioners argue that the respondents' cause of action has prescribed and that they have acquired ownership through adverse possession. They also raise the issue of non-joinder of indispensable parties, though this was not raised in lower courts.
Issue(s)
Whether the petitioners-appellants acquired ownership of the respondents-appellees' shares through acquisitive and extinctive prescription. Whether the cause of action of the respondents-appellees has prescribed. Whether the lower court erred in disregarding the testimony of Benito de Guzman regarding the possession of the land by the defendants-appellants and his knowledge of the sale. Whether the lower court erred in not ruling that the appellants have acquired ownership of the land in question through acquisitive and extinctive prescription. Whether the case should be dismissed for the non-inclusion of indispensable parties.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the petition for lack of merit. The petitioners-appellants failed to establish their claim of acquisitive prescription over the respondents-appellees' shares in the fishpond.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of prescription and adverse possession: The Court held that the possession of the petitioners-appellants could not be considered adverse and in the concept of an owner against the respondents-appellees. The testimony of Benito de Guzman indicated that while he knew of the petitioners' possession since 1948, he only learned of the sale when informed by his brothers who sold their shares, and he only saw the deed of sale during the proceedings. This lack of definite awareness regarding the extent and nature of the petitioners' possession, particularly concerning their own shares, prevented the possession from being adverse and open. Furthermore, a fishpond, being a property owned in common, requires more overt acts to establish adverse possession compared to a parcel of land. The mere harvesting of fish by a co-owner is presumed to be within their rightful share unless proven otherwise, which was not sufficiently demonstrated by the petitioners. The fact that the tax declaration remained in the name of the original owners also militated against the claim of adverse possession in the concept of an owner. The Court reiterated that for prescription to be legally effective, possession must be adverse, open, and in the concept of an owner, citing various jurisprudence. On the interruption of possession by acknowledgment of rights: The Court found that the petitioners-appellants' promise to pay Benito de Guzman for his share constituted a continuing recognition of the respondents-appellees' rights over their respective shares. This promise, not having been expressly withdrawn, interrupted any potential possession that could ripen into acquisitive prescription. The Court distinguished this from a mere failure to pay, emphasizing that an unequivocal act of refusal or definite reneging from a promise is required to constitute repudiation of trust or adverse possession, especially when no fixed date for fulfillment was set. The promise to pay for the share was correctly held by the Court of Appeals to interrupt possession as a source of prescriptive rights, citing San Carlos vs. Municipality of Cebu. On the relevance of Article 1155 of the Civil Code: The Court clarified that Article 1155 of the Civil Code, which deals with the interruption of prescription of actions, is not relevant to the interruption of possession for acquisitive prescriptive purposes. The cited provision pertains to the prescription of actions, which is distinct from the interruption of possession required for acquiring ownership through prescription. The ruling in San Carlos vs. Municipality of Cebu was applied, emphasizing that any acknowledgment by the possessor of the dominant rights of the true owner interrupts possession for prescriptive purposes. On the issue of indispensable parties: The Court upheld the respondents-appellees' contention that the question of non-inclusion of indispensable parties was never raised in the Motion to Dismiss filed with the trial court nor in the brief before the Court of Appeals. Therefore, it could not be raised for the first time before the Supreme Court. The Court also noted that representative suits are permissible and that non-joinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal, citing relevant provisions of law and jurisprudence, including Article 487 of the Civil Code (co-owner's right to bring an action for ejectment) and Article 1111 of the Civil Code (prescription obtained by a co-owner benefits others). On the overall merit of the petition: Given that all assignments of error were found to be without merit, the Court concluded that the petition was devoid of merit. The weight of justice and equity favored the respondents-appellees, who had not parted with their share, against the weak defense of prescription presented by the appellants. The Court found no reason to deviate from the conclusions of the Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeals.
Main Doctrine
The possession of a co-owner over the property, especially a fishpond, cannot be considered adverse and in the concept of an owner against other co-owners unless there is a clear and unequivocal act of repudiation of the co-ownership, and mere failure to deliver shares or to render an accounting does not automatically constitute adverse possession, especially when there is an acknowledgment of the co-owners' rights.