Cabales v. Nery
REITERATIONFacts
1. The Antecedents: The underlying dispute concerns a claim for recovery of a portion of real property located in barrio Agusan, Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners, the Cabales family and Alejandro Torres, asserted long-standing possession of the disputed property and questioned the plaintiff's (Joseto Tan Nery) legal capacity to sue, alleging he had already sold the property. The plaintiff later amended his complaint to include the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) as a party, due to a conditional sale agreement. 2. Procedural History: The plaintiff, Joseto Tan Nery, initially filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. After several amendments involving the DBP, the case was dismissed without prejudice on September 23, 1966, due to the non-appearance of parties. The trial court set aside this dismissal, but the defendants and their counsel again failed to appear at a subsequent hearing on October 16, 1966. The court then rendered a decision ex parte in favor of the plaintiff on November 16, 1966. The defendants' counsel filed a petition for relief from judgment on January 24, 1967, citing accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. This petition was denied by the trial court on March 3, 1967. The Court of Appeals affirmed this denial on April 15, 1970. 3. The Petition: The petitioners seek review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the denial of their petition for relief from judgment. They argue that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in not granting the relief, citing their counsel's alleged excusable negligence due to misplacing the notice of hearing. They also contend that the Court of Appeals failed to consider an affidavit from a surveyor indicating their land is outside the disputed property. The petition asserts that the filing of the petition for relief was timely. The core issue is whether the grounds presented constitute sufficient accident, mistake, or excusable negligence to warrant setting aside the judgment.
Issue(s)
Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the denial of the petition for relief from judgment. Whether the Court of Appeals failed to consider the affidavit of the surveyor stating that the petitioners' land is outside the property of the private respondent. Whether the petition for relief was filed within the reglementary period.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, upholding the denial of the petition for relief from judgment. The Court found that the grounds presented by the petitioners' counsel for non-appearance did not constitute fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence as contemplated by the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Court ruled that a special defense, such as the one based on the surveyor's affidavit, must be pleaded at the trial court and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Ratio Decidendi
On the issue of grave abuse of discretion in denying the petition for relief: The Court held that the grounds presented by the petitioners' counsel, namely, inadvertently mixing the notice of hearing with papers of another case and forgetting about it, do not constitute fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that would justify setting aside a judgment. The Court emphasized that such a ruling would place a premium on forgetfulness and lack of diligence. The Court reiterated the principle that a prudent lawyer must keep a separate record or diary of hearings and professional engagements. Mere forgetfulness of a counsel is not a sufficient ground for relief. The Court also noted that the petitioners themselves were not entirely blameless, as they should have made inquiries from their counsel regarding the status of their case. The negligence of the counsel is binding upon the clients, and a client cannot complain that the result might have been different had counsel proceeded differently. The matter of affording relief is largely discretionary with the judge, and abuse must be patent. On the issue of the surveyor's affidavit: The Court ruled that the affidavit of surveyor Francisco P. Lumasag, which related to the petitioners' defense, was not averred in the petition for relief before the trial court. It only surfaced on appeal to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to the Supreme Court. The Court reiterated the well-settled rule that a special defense must be specifically pleaded in order to give the trial court an opportunity to pass upon the issue raised. A defense not properly pleaded before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. On the timeliness of the petition for relief: While the petition for relief was filed within the reglementary period after receipt of the decision, the Court found that the grounds for relief were insufficient. The Court noted that the petitioners' counsel received a motion for execution on January 3, 1967, and the petition for relief was only filed on January 24, 1967, further weakening their claim of accident or excusable negligence.
Main Doctrine
A client is bound by the actions of his counsel, and the negligence of the counsel, even if it results in prejudice to the client, binds the client. Mere forgetfulness or lack of diligence on the part of counsel is not sufficient ground to grant a petition for relief from judgment. A special defense not properly pleaded before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.